Predictable Punishments by Galle, Brian & Mungan, Murat
UC Irvine Law Review 





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brian Galle & Murat Mungan, Predictable Punishments, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 337 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol11/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons. 




Brian Galle* & Murat Mungan** 
Economic analyses of both crime and regulation writ large suggest that the subjective 
cost or value of incentives is critical to their effectiveness. But reliable information about 
subjective valuation is scarce, as those who are punished have little reason to report honestly. 
Modern “big data” techniques promise to overcome this information shortfall but perhaps at 
the cost of individual privacy and the autonomy that privacy’s shield provides. 
This Article argues that regulators can and should instead rely on methods that remain 
accurate even in the face of limited information. Building on a formal model we present 
elsewhere, we show that variability in a defendant’s subjective costs of punishment should be 
a key consideration in any incentive system, whether it be criminal law or otherwise. Our 
model suggests that this variability can be mitigated with some familiar and well-tested tools. 
For instance, in some situations, ex ante taxes on behavior that create a risk of harm can be 
preferable to ex post punitive regimes, such as the criminal law, that target primarily harms 
that actually arise. 
Because of what we show to be the centrality of variation in subjective costs, we also 
argue that long-standing approaches to criminal theory and practice should be reconsidered. 
For example, economic theory strongly prefers fines over other forms of punishment. We argue 
that this claim is typically right—indeed, it is understated—when applied to firms. But fines 
can be the wrong choice for incentivizing most humans, while ex ante taxes are a promising 
alternative. We also show that this same analysis counsels that, if prison is the most viable 
punishment available, it can be more efficient to make prisons safer and less alienating. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When James pled guilty, everyone in the courtroom believed that James was a 
citizen.1 The year was 2001, James was twenty years old, and he was accepting a 
sentence of thirty hours of community service in exchange for his guilty plea to a 
charge of receiving stolen property. What the sentencing court didn’t  
know—couldn’t know, given that James seemed to be a citizen—was that the plea 
deal would make James deportable. Fifteen years later, he was arrested on his way 
home from a Caribbean vacation, then later detained and placed into deportation 
proceedings. Though it was slow in arriving, James’s “punishment”—or at the least 
the consequences he suffered as a result of his plea—ended up exceeding by several 
times over the sentence the court thought it was imposing.  
This is an article about sentencing uncertainty and about uncertainty in the 
regulatory system more broadly. Thanks to the vast array of “collateral 
consequences” that now flow from a criminal conviction—deportation, eviction, 
disbarment, a permanently stained reputation—it can be difficult for a sentencing 
judge to predict just how severe the consequences will be for any given defendant.2 
Nor is uncertainty limited only to collateral consequences. A year in prison that 
might be bearable for some can be a special kind of torture for the defendant who 
 
1. James’s story is told in Steve Coll, When ICE Tries to Deport Americans, Who Defends Them?, 
NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 2018. 
2. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
684–92 (2014) (surveying collateral consequences in the United States). Collateral effects are common 
in other punitive regulatory regimes in addition to the criminal law. Joshua D. Blank, Collateral 
Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 728–44 (2014) (summarizing collateral punishments in tax system). 
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needs (but only irregularly receives) kidney dialysis daily. Much evidence now 
suggests that when a corporation is penalized for lawbreaking, most of the harms 
the firm suffers are not the government’s official sanction, but reputational damage 
with its customers and business partners.3 Often these harms are difficult for the 
regulator to predict in advance.4  
As other writers have observed, uncertain punishments can seriously damage 
criminal justice—and, we’d add, other regulatory systems.5 Economically speaking, 
the “optimal” punishment is the one that best balances the costs of wrongdoing 
against the cost of enforcement and compliance.6 Under certain assumptions, this 
optimal sentence should be the same for everyone who commits the same kind of 
crime: injurers efficiently “internalize” the costs of their acts when they face an 
expected cost that mirrors the social impact of their deeds.7  
 
3. See Anthony Bottoms & Andrew Von Hirsch, The Crime-Preventive Impact of Penal 
Sanctions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 96, 121 (Peter Cane  
& Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of 
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 55, 125–26 (2003). 
4. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing 
Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 763 (1993). 
5. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and 
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009); Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009); John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 
30 ECON. INQUIRY 583, 584 (1992); see also Miriam H. Baer, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated 
Sentencing: A Response to Professor Kolber, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 12–14 (2009) (agreeing 
with Kolber about the subjective experience but recommending different solutions). Those who reject 
economic or incentive-based explanations for the criminal law may not be as troubled. See Dan Markel 
& Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98  
CALIF. L. REV. 907, 911–15 (2010) (arguing retributivists should not care that defendants’ subjective 
experience of punishment varies). 
6. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 138–39 (2011); Isaac Ehrlich, 
Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSPS. 43, 50 (1996).  
 We acknowledge that an economic approach to crime will not appeal to all readers. We are 
welfarists, and so we believe that good policy should aim to maximize overall social well-being. In 
making those calculations, society’s preferences for distributive or other kinds of justice are an 
important input. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
990–91 (2001). Some theorists of crime, though, would elevate “retributive justice” over other moral 
considerations. E.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 181–82 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1  
VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5–6 (2012). We don’t ignore retributive justice, but we give it less weight than these 
other commentators. While retributivists may not accept all our analysis, we think it should be relevant 
to them at least for “regulatory” offenses and other crimes that are not ordinarily a source of moral 
opprobrium, if they agree those should be punishable at all. See Markel, supra, at 12–14 (arguing for 
retributivist approach to “mala prohibitum” offenses).  
7. See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30  
J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 678–80 (1992). Essentially, this statement in the main text holds whenever 
all defendants are equally likely to offend (or, put another way, receive the same “benefit” from  
non-compliance), to be detected, and to cause harm of a given level. 
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If the burdens of punishment were truly unpredictable, economics might have 
little complaint,8 but the trouble is that instead defendants often have a better sense 
of their likely outcomes than the government can have. James knew that he didn’t 
have any paperwork showing he was a citizen; corporations know how important 
their reputations are to a successful relationship with their customers. Defendants 
who know that they will suffer unusually heavy burdens will be more deterred than 
average, while those who believe themselves relatively less vulnerable will be less 
deterred. If the government or regulator has set the sentence at the level that 
provides for optimal deterrence of the average offender, those who are not average 
will be over- or underdeterred.9 As we’ll explain, the social cost of these errors rises 
steeply, so that even modest-sized mistakes can inflict serious societal harm.  
As we said, uncertainty is not limited to what we traditionally think of as 
“collateral” or unintended sanctions. Again, the subjective experience of prison can 
vary widely from individual to individual. Even dollar incentives, such as fines, tort 
awards, or taxes, can arguably have an unpredictable impact. The burden of a few 
hundred-dollar fines might seem trivial to most people. But for the drivers of 
Ferguson, Missouri—and many other places in America—a few small fines quickly 
snowball into serious life trouble. People who live on the edge of financial 
catastrophe have a vastly different utility cost of a hundred-dollar payment than 
those who live on the edge of a cliff with spectacular ocean views.10 There’s no clear 
scholarly consensus on how economic analysis of regulation should reflect this 
reality.11 We’ll argue that several of the major rival approaches would require 
regulators to account for individual variation in the “marginal utility” of each dollar, 
and that this variation in fact is usually unobservable.12  
 
8. Holding the average sentence constant, an unpredictable sentence reduction actually 
increases welfare because it reduces the defendant’s suffering without increasing crime. But the reverse 
is of course true about unpredictable sentence increases.  
9. We explain this claim in more detail in Part II. 
10. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
11. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1578–80 (2002); John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603,  
1645–50 (2013); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better 
than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 45, 46 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Risks, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 592, 621 (A. Mitchell Polinsky  
& Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  
 For discussion in the criminal law context, see David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A 
Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905 (2013); Sonja Starr, On the Role of  
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Justice Policy: A Response to the Imprisoner’s Dilemma, 98 IOWA  
L. REV. BULL. 97, 101 (2013). 
12. W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and Overview, 
40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 7–11 (2010) (summarizing findings on ways in which wealth affects 
individuals’ willingness to pay for safety); cf. Robin Boadway, Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY 47, 71–72 (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey 
eds., 2016) (arguing that uncertainty of project outcomes creates costs for risk-averse individuals that 
should be part of cost-benefit analysis but that doing so accurately is “difficult”). 
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We aim to make several original contributions to the study of uncertain 
punishment (or rewards or other incentives). First, we set out in more detail than 
others have the sources and consequences of uncertainty. This establishes the 
groundwork for what we view as our most important additions: a series of proposals 
for how the criminal justice system (or other regulators) can either reduce 
uncertainty or use it to strategic advantage. Drawing on a formal economic model 
we set out elsewhere, we show that the most efficient regulatory system will typically 
aim to punish in ways that minimize the disparity in costs defendants suffer.13 Since 
achieving that goal is costly along several dimensions, we also examine how to 
balance it against other important objectives, such as deterrence and  
administrative costs.  
Of course, one natural way to minimize disparities between defendants is to 
observe the ways in which they are different and to adjust the formal punishment 
imposed to offset each defendant’s unique circumstances. For example, John Lott, 
once the chief economist of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, has argued that fines 
should be lowered against corporations when those firms would suffer significant 
reputational damage as a result of the court’s sentence.14 Adam Kolber urges, 
perhaps tongue a bit in cheek, that those who take proportional retributive justice 
as the goal of punishment must individually examine and correct for the experience 
 
 Proponents of cost-benefit analysis typically argue that the varying marginal value of a dollar does 
not interfere with the CBA project. Instead, regulators should maximize total dollar savings but use 
taxes and cash transfers to iron out any inequality that results. David A. Weisbach, Distributionally 
Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
151, 161 (2015). For instance, if cost-benefit analysis counsels citing a power plant in a poor 
neighborhood because wealthier districts are willing to pay more to avoid pollution, the government 
could tax the wealthier district and use the resulting funds to pay the poor near the plant’s location. See 
Boadway, supra, at 67–68 (explaining possibility of trades that make both parties better off). As long as 
this cash amount is less than what the rich would pay to escape pollution, and more than the poor 
would pay, everyone is better off. Bronsteen et al., supra note 11, at 1653.  
 Many other experts reject this approach. See Boadway, supra, at 58; Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency 
Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1688–91 (2018) [hereinafter Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased? ]. 
Empirically, we don’t observe that such transfers take place. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, 
The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1079–92 (2016); Zachary 
Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts from School Finance Litigation, 15 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 36–38 (2018). Other scholars note that such transfers would be 
impossible both politically and economically because of the large distortions that such transfers would 
impose. See Boadway, supra, at 60–61. 
 A major alternative is to incorporate so-called “welfare” or “distributional” weights. Id. at 63–67; 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1999). 
That is, the researcher adjusts the dollar costs and benefits she measures to reflect the varying value of 
a dollar (and of other impacts) across the population. This method necessarily requires that such values 
be observed at some level of generality. See id. at 189–90. 
13. Brian D. Galle & Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Enforcement with Heterogeneous Private Costs 
of Punishment (George Mason Univ. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. 19-11, 2019), https:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3380273 [https://perma.cc/J5PH-GG6T].  
14. Lott, supra note 5, at 584. 
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of each defendant—in the future, for instance, by conducting brain scans of 
criminal defendants to measure their response to punishment.15  
While we don’t necessarily reject the possibility or appeal of these kinds of 
individualized adjustments, we argue that they are impractical in a wide variety of 
important settings. For instance, even if his sentencing court had known James 
would be subject to deportation, no reduction of his thirty-hour sentence could 
have come close to offsetting the impact of his later detention and potential 
deportation.16 So, too, for Lott’s corporations: since reputational damage is often 
several times larger than the formal sentence, courts would actually have to award 
money to defendant firms to offset their reputational harm.17 
Individualized adjustment also demands credible information and that can be 
expensive or even socially painful to collect.18 Perhaps a more feasible approach to 
Kolber’s brain scans, but one arguably no less intrusive, would be to ask algorithms 
to collect everything that’s observable about the people we regulate, so as to better 
know how they will respond when regulated.19 “Big data”—along with other 
techniques for aggregating vast quantities of information about us—thus offers a 
tempting devil’s bargain to modern governments, posing a stark tradeoff between 
privacy and other efficiency goals. If efficiency depends on panoptic surveillance 
of the regulated population, it comes at a steep, albeit currently unmeasured, price.20  
There is a third option, which we view as our largest addition to the literature. 
It may be possible to select regulatory instruments that minimize the importance of 
heterogeneous individual responses, that is, of the subjective experience of the 
regulated.21 We thus ask what regulators should do in the face of unobservable or 
otherwise uncorrected subjective experiences. And we propose that instead of 
adjusting each regulatory instrument in a thousand ways, regulators should choose 
 
15. Kolber, supra note 5, at 220. 
16. Cf. Blank, supra note 2, at 756 (observing that personal burden of many collateral tax 
sanctions is often larger than any legally authorized monetary penalty). 
17. Cf. Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr. & Eric W. Wehrly, The Reputational Penalties for 
Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 655–56 (2005) (stating that 
reputational penalties are usually much larger than formal sanctions, but reporting evidence that shows 
this is not always true of environmental offenses). 
18. See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 282–84 (2004) (describing 
costs to regulatory system of acquiring information held by private parties). 
19. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 
1403 (2017) (arguing that “predictive technology” will allow law to “provide [rules] finely tailored to 
every possible scenario”); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91  
N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 629, 674–85 (2016) (calling for “customized standard of care” in tort law using 
“Big Data” and measurable characteristics of injurer). See generally Symposium, Personalized Law, 86  
U. CHI. L. REV. 217 (2019). 
20. Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big 
Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88  
S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1149–70 (2015); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 354–61 (2008). 
21. We develop this argument in detail infra Section II.B.  
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instruments that need less adjustment. That is, government should aim to make 
everyone perceive one unit of its incentive—be that a dollar, a night in jail, or some 
combination—as equally pleasant or unpleasant across individuals.  
Thus, our analysis suggests that safer and less alienating prisons can create 
benefits by reducing variance between prisoners. Prisons that don’t protect 
prisoners from one another make those who can’t defend themselves, or who are 
reluctant to commit violence against others, suffer more. Failing to provide 
adequate medical care punishes detainees with failing kidneys more than those who 
don’t need dialysis. And when jail time severs a defendant’s ties to family, job, and 
community, it is harshest on those who could work or who have people close to 
them. The good of eliminating these variances (even leaving aside their cruelty and 
injustice) should be balanced against the potential costs of providing safer and less 
alienating prisons.  
Our model also suggests that government should prefer some incentives over 
others. To ground this point in a concrete example, we apply our analysis to one of 
the most celebrated results in the economic study of crime: the claim by Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell that government should generally prefer fines over 
other forms of punishment.22 Briefly, the duo show that fines are superior because 
fines serve to transfer resources instead of wasting them. That is, while twenty 
lashes might deter a pirate, the suffering that results benefits no one.23 If the pirate 
instead is made to pay in doubloons, that wealth can pay for socially useful projects, 
which could potentially include compensating his victims.  
In addition to this well-known “transferability” benefit, we show that fines 
have a second advantage over their alternatives, at least when it comes to regulating 
firms or other parties with a constant marginal utility of money (who are often 
referred to in the legal literature as “risk neutral”). For these defendants, a dollar 
really is a dollar, no matter who pays it. The theory Polinsky and Shavell offer does 
not distinguish between fines (or tort awards) and other instruments that could also 
transfer wealth. For instance, in competitive industries, a temporary ban on doing 
business enriches the banned firm’s competitors. Our model suggests that fines are 
superior to these bans or other transfer alternatives because fines are more certain. 
For example, fines may be more certain because there is no variation across 
individuals in their valuations of money, but there is variation across individuals in 
how much they would profit or lose from a ban. Thus, in addition to enjoying a 
“transferability benefit” over other “sticks” (including imprisonment), fines also 
enjoy a “variance reduction” benefit over other sticks (which may or may not be 
monetary).  
 
22. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 403, 420–21 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
23. But see generally MARQUIS DE SADE, JUSTINE, OR THE MISFORTUNES OF VIRTUE ( John 
Phillips trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1791) (warning: not safe for work).  
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This previously underappreciated variance reduction benefit of fines implies 
important changes to how we usually regulate. For example, another key result in 
the economics of crime is that government should impose large fines on just a few 
people, in order to minimize the costs of detection and enforcement.24 But the 
larger the fine, the more likely the defendant won’t be able to pay. That means jail 
time instead. As Polinsky and Shavell have shown, the bigger the drop-off in 
efficiency between fines and the next-best choice, the worse it is for society when 
the defendant can’t pay.25 It follows that as fines become stronger options, we 
should be willing to pay more to track down more criminals, so that we can avoid 
having to send them to jail. In some cases, it might even make more sense to impose 
ex ante taxes on risks, rather than ex post punishments on realized harms.  
Our advice looks very different when it comes to regulating individuals, 
however. Depending on how one accounts for the varying marginal utility of 
money, fines may also have important disadvantages that could weigh in favor of 
alternatives. In models that allow the same dollars to have varying impact depending 
on the available wealth the defendant has to draw on, fines are a relatively  
high-variance instrument.26 This same criticism could be applied to similar  
dollar-denominated incentives, such as taxes imposed on bad behavior (often 
dubbed “Pigouvian” taxes after the economist who popularized them,  
A.C. Pigou).27 
Yet another practical application of our project is to the burgeoning 
movement for “automatic” expungement of criminal records. California, Utah, and 
Pennsylvania have already adopted rules that make most criminal records secret 
without need for the lengthy and bureaucratic process that traditionally has 
accompanied expungement.28 Our analysis suggests that expungements are often 
efficient for reasons commentators have not previously identified. But we also offer 
cautionary notes that would likely imply that expungements should not apply to 
every crime.  
Part I of this Article will offer background on economic theories of regulation 
for readers new to that literature. In Part II we first provide a (relatively!) math-free 
explanation of the social costs of regulation under varying subjective valuation of 
the regulator’s incentives.29 As we acknowledge, this claim depends on a pair of key 
assumptions, and we detail what changes if those assumptions don’t hold. We then 
argue that there are a few paths to minimizing the costs of subjective value, 
including by selecting less variant instruments, by engineering instruments to be less 
varying, by punishing more often in smaller amounts, and by using combinations of 
 
24. We summarize this literature infra Section III.A. 
25. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 419. 
26. See infra Section III.A. 
27. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 135. 
28. Assemb. B. 1076, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); H.B. 431, 63rd Leg., 2019  
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019); H.B. 1419, 202d Gen. Assemb., 2018 Sess. (Pa. 2018). 
29. Full disclosure: there’s some math.  
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incentives. Part III offers our finer-grained analysis of fines, first with respect to 
people and then with respect to risk-neutral actors. We then conclude.  
I. THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS 
This Part reviews the economic approach to crime. Readers already familiar 
with these points can skip to Part II.  
Criminal law is a form of regulation, and regulation is a balancing act, a 
tightrope walk in the dark. We regulate to change how others behave. Yet 
compliance is costly, and in deflecting private parties away from the path they would 
have chosen themselves, we may frustrate worthy goals and designs.30 Eliminating 
even the worst pollutants is costly. Should government bankrupt coal producers, or 
is there a way to balance clean air against the costs of achieving it? A regulator who 
accounts for these losses must constantly weigh the gains that regulation offers 
against its costs.31 Sometimes the left side of the scale outweighs the right, and we 
don’t regulate at all. But balancing importantly informs not just whether to regulate 
but how.32 What’s the right fuel efficiency target for automobile fleets? How long 
should patents be? What’s the right sentence for armed robbery?  
A. Optimal Regulation 
Modern economic theories of regulation formalize these problems and make 
them choices of the “optimal” design of the government’s incentives.33 The policy 
analyst measures the gains and losses each incremental change in policy would 
produce and tries to pick the spot on the continuum that best balances competing 
interests.34 Under this “marginal” analytical approach, the policy maker asks herself, 
“on the margin—that is, for the very next unit of good or bad produced—what is 
the harm or benefit of that one unit for everyone in society?”35 If increasing the 
amount of regulated activity would harm some people, we call this the “marginal 
social damage” (MSD) and “marginal social benefit” (MSB) for an improvement.36 
We then compare this harm or benefit against the marginal costs to the party being 
regulated, who we’ll call here the “subject” of regulation.  
Regulators usually set policy optimally when marginal social damage is equal 
to the subject’s marginal cost of compliance.37 Why equal? Well, we don’t want the 
 
30. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
31. Cropper & Oates, supra note 7, at 678–80.  
32. Id. at 680. 
33. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 137–39; Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 50.  
34. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 139. 
35. See id. at 126. 
36. Id. at 124–26. 
37. Gloria E. Helfand, Peter Berck & Tim Maull, The Theory of Pollution Policy, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 249, 253 (Karl-Goran Maher & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003). 
We’re simplifying here for the sake of exposition. A more rigorous approach to setting the optimal 
quantity would also account for other factors that might affect the efficiency of the regulation. For 
example, if the regulation imposes costs, and the expectation of those costs changes behaviors other 
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costs of compliance to exceed the benefits: we might want the subject to reduce 
sulfur emissions, but it perhaps wouldn’t make sense to spend, say, $100 million to 
extract one more ton of sulfur from the air.38 What about when marginal social 
benefits exceed private compliance costs? Then we want to encourage more 
compliance, as otherwise we will have left cost-effective improvements on the 
table—if we can prevent a ton of sulfur for one dollar, we should do it.  
One common way to encourage subjects to comply with regulation is by 
setting a price.39 Suppose the EPA concludes that the optimal level of sulfur 
regulation falls at $1 million per ton of sulfur. At that point, the next ton of sulfur 
we prevent creates only, say, $990,000 worth of benefits for air-breathers but costs 
$1.1 million. We might then impose a one-million-per-ton tax on sulfur emissions.40 
Polluters that can reduce their sulfur for less than $1 million per ton will do so. 
Those who would have to pay more than $1 million will instead emit sulfur and pay 
the $1 million tax. No one will pay more to prevent sulfur emissions than the 
marginal social benefit EPA has calculated. 
B. Errors and Information 
Governments can use prices (among other tools) to convince private parties 
to set their production of good things or bad at optimal levels, but how does 
government know what the optimum is? Again, the optimum is the point at which 
public gains and private losses are exactly balanced. Determining benefits can be 
challenging because of difficulties of measurement or because they turn on value 
judgments, such as the moral importance of preserving endangered species, that the 
regulator must decide.41 Private compliance costs are even trickier.42 By definition, 
this data is typically in private hands. And the subjects of regulation often have every 
incentive to conceal or exaggerate their private compliance costs.43  
 
than the production of the externality, such as by distorting consumer choices among products, then 
the ideal regulation might balance disruption of these expectations against pollution control. Helmuth 
Cremer, Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 343, 
346 (1998). 
38. Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 51. Note, importantly, that for simplicity we are assuming here that 
we should count the costs and benefits for the producer and everyone else equally. That’s a 
controversial proposition, but our later claims apply whether or not one agrees with it. 
39. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 135. 
40. More technically, the standard recommendation is to set prices a bit below the point at 
which remediation costs and marginal social damage are equal. Enforcement is costly, and emissions at 
close to the intersection point impose only a tiny net social cost. Thus, it will typically be efficient to 
allow some degree of underenforcement.  Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 410. 
41. Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1375–76 (2014).  
42. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 142; Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 278. 
43. THOMAS STERNER & JESSICA CORIA, POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 168 (2013). For a formal model of the underlying game theory, 
see Evan Kwerel, To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control, 44  
REV. ECON. STUD. 595, 597 (1977). 
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Policy outcomes get worse and worse as regulators grow more uncertain about 
optimal behavior.44 Again, if we set levels to be too high or too low, we have lost 
social welfare in either direction: either wasteful overregulation, or lost 
opportunities for efficient regulation. All else equal, these losses get bigger 
exponentially as the government’s error increases.45 That is, an error in which the 
government’s regulatory target is ten percent off is, on average, four times as bad as 
one in which it is off by five percent.46  
Why is that? Intuitively, the idea is that two things are happening as errors get 
bigger: First, every person affected is affected more. With a pollution tax that is 
$100  too high, each polluter wastes up to $100 overcomplying instead of just fifty 
dollars. Second, more parties are affected. A small error makes a difference for just 
a few subjects. But as errors get larger, there are more and more subjects for whom 
the difference in price actually matters to their behavior. Multiply these two factors 
together, and you get exponential increases. When the fine is fifty dollars too high, 
one factory overcomplies by fifty dollars; when it’s $100 too high, two factories 
might overcomply by up to $100 each.  
So when the government is unsure about private costs of compliance, it runs 
a risk that it will set its target “optimal” level too high or too low.47 To be sure, 
regulators can hedge their bets. If the regulator knows that the costs of 
undercompliance are likely worse than the costs of overcompliance—nuclear power 
plant safety is a classic example—it can try to make sure it errs on the side of 
overregulating or vice versa.48 Inevitably, though, the government’s lack of 
complete information threatens to undermine the benefits of regulating.49  
Very similar information problems can infect other parts of the regulatory 
system. As we’ve just seen, parties act optimally when they face a price for failure 
to comply that is set at the intersection of the private cost and marginal social 
benefit curves. But what if the parties get the price wrong? If the price of a speeding 
ticket is scientifically calculated to produce the socially efficient amount of 
speeding, but no one knows what the cost of a ticket will be, they are likely to speed 
more or less than would be optimal.50 Drivers might also be unsure about the 
expected fine—that is, unsure not just of the amount of the fines, but also of the 
likelihood that they will be caught speeding.51 The expected fine is just the product 
 
44. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 775–79 (1996). 
45. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 143–44. 
46. The math underlying this example assumes, as in conventional public finance economics, 
that there is a uniform and continuous distribution of prevention costs and regulatory benefits. Id. 
47. Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURVS. 267,  
274 (1997). 
48. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 144–46. 
49. STERNER & CORIA, supra note 43; Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 282–85. 
50. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 439–40. 
51. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are 
Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 366–67 (1992). 
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of these two: ticket amount times the chance of being caught. As Lucian Bebchuk 
and Louis Kaplow have shown, private parties who are mistaken about the odds of 
being caught produce error costs exactly as though the government had set its 
optimal level incorrectly.52  
To correct either of these problems—private mistakes about penalties and 
likelihood of detection—the government could adjust either of those variables to 
account for the errors. For instance, if drivers underestimate the likelihood of being 
caught speeding, we could patrol more or write bigger tickets.53 But to do that 
effectively, the regulator must have a sense of who was making the mistakes, how 
often, and by how much.54 If we instead change penalties for everyone, we will  
over- or underdeter those with accurate perceptions.55  
C. Fines First 
For simplicity so far, we’ve assumed that government regulates entirely 
through prices, but of course there are many other ways regulators can influence 
private behavior. Another common option, for instance, is to mandate a permissible 
level of activity and to impose severe sanctions (e.g., jail) on those who exceed it. 
Economists often call the first of these approaches a “price instrument”56 and the 
second “quantity regulation.”57  
Most commentators strongly favor price instruments over quantity regulation, 
except in settings where special administrative considerations make prices 
impractical.58 As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell show, prices can be used to 
duplicate most of the features of mandates.59 Prices provide vital information to the 
government that regulation supposedly does not.60 Further, prices are said to 
provide for revenues that the government can use for other projects.61 
 
52. Id. Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen & Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm  
vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888, 888–901 (1990), 
reach a similar result. They observe that tort defendants may sometimes be unsure if they will be found 
to have acted negligently, even where they were objectively negligent. This reduces the expected cost 
of the sanction, resulting in under-deterrence. 
53. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 439. 
54. Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 282–85. 
55. See Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 74–76 (2013). 
56. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 139. 
57. Id. at 137. 
58. Id. at 140; Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester & Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes, in 
DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 231 ( James Mirrlees ed., 2011); Cropper  
& Oates, supra note 7, at 686.  
 For a more complete account taking into account political and other practical considerations, see 
STERNER & CORIA, supra note 43. 
59. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7–10 (2002). But see STERNER & CORIA, supra note 43, at 149. 
60. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 4. 
61. E.g., Helfand et al., supra note 37, at 287; Ian Parry, Roberton Williams III & Lawrence  
H. Goulder, When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted 
Factor Markets, 37 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 52, 52 (1999). 
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Mitchell Polinsky and Shavell have developed these arguments in great detail 
in the criminal enforcement context, where they argue for the primacy of fines over 
all other forms of punishment.62 In some ways, their argument is very 
straightforward. Fines, like other price instruments, generate funds that the 
government can use for constructive ends, such as compensating victims.63 In 
contrast, most other forms of punishment are simply “deadweight loss”: while they 
inflict suffering on the individual punished, they provide nothing to anyone else.64 
Since a fine can, in theory, be set at a level that replicates any given level of penalty 
and transfers the defendant’s pain for the benefit of others, the fine is said to be 
always superior to other options.65 
Of course, the problem with this prescription is that many wrongdoers cannot 
afford to pay a fine set at the optimal level.66 For these judgment-proof defendants, 
some other incentive must be found. In our system, of course, the usual option is 
incarceration. Polinsky and Shavell concede this point but argue that fines should 
in most situations be set at the maximum level that any given individual can afford, 
so as to maximize the amount of the punishment that is transferred to others.67 
Other forms of punishment should be imposed only to the extent that individuals 
cannot be optimally deterred through fines. 
Notice that fines differ from the pollution prices we’ve been describing in at 
least one important respect. Fines—or, equivalently, tort awards for damages—are 
typically imposed and collected after a defendant has caused a harm to others and 
been caught doing it.68 In contrast, the typical pollution tax becomes payable when 
the party has undertaken an act that created a risk of harm.69 These are sometimes 
described as ex post and ex ante versions of price instruments, respectively.70  
Professor Shavell and others argue in favor of ex post instruments because 
predicting risks is usually harder than measuring real outcomes: after the fact, our 
information is better.71 Yet we may sometimes be willing to accept the risk of limited 
 
62. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 420. 
63. Id. at 407. 
64. Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 63. 
65. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 419. 
66. Garoupa, supra note 47, at 270–71; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 407. 
67. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 411. For more detailed treatment on the optimal 
combination of jail and fines, see Nuno Garoupa & Murat Mungan, Optimal Imprisonment and Fines 
with Non-Discriminatory Sentences, 182 ECON. LETTERS 105 (2019). 
68. Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful 
Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255–56 (2011). 
69. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post 
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1268–80 (1998). 
70. Id. Just to make things even more confusing, some things the legal system calls a “fine” 
would, in our framework, be ex ante taxes. Take speeding tickets. The ticket is officially labelled a 
“fine.” But in fact, what’s happening is that we are putting a small charge on the risk of a dangerous 
accident, rather than relying fully on tort awards after the accident occurs.  
71. Shavell, supra note 68, at 251–52; Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post  
Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 200 (1977). For more 
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information in the case where fines are impractical, such as for judgment-proof 
defendants.72 
An economic puzzle about the U.S. system of law enforcement, then, is its 
remarkable devotion to incarceration. Jail is an ex post remedy for defendants who 
can’t afford to pay a fine large enough to provide optimal deterrence.73 Jail time is, 
as readers surely know, incredibly widespread in the United States. But many other 
potential tools could also prevent crime—in particular, ex ante tools that aim to 
reduce the risks of criminal acts rather than punishing those that actually occur.74 
Then, too, there is the possibility that some actors could be rewarded for not 
committing crimes, an option that would not depend at all on whether the regulated 
parties can afford to pay fines.75 None of these have received serious attention as 
alternatives.76 In the next part, we offer new reasons for giving them a closer look.  
II. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVE INCENTIVE VALUE 
In this Part, we examine another problem that can potentially foil government 
efforts at regulation: uncorrectable variations in the regulated party’s subjective 
valuation of the government’s incentive. In a separate project, we show through 
formal mathematical modeling that these kinds of variation can have the same 
unwanted impact on regulation as the other potential obstacles already familiar to 
the literature, obstacles we described in Part I.77 Here we offer the underlying logic 
 
extensive review of the literature and arguments for its limitations, see Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante 
Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1725–48 (2015). 
 Shavell does argue that government should punish attempts. Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the 
Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 436 (1990). But that is not precisely ex ante in the 
sense we intend it here. In our definition, an ex ante incentive is one that is both assessed and collected 
by the government before the risky activity actually results in any outcome. Shavell would still punish 
attempts after they are detected and have failed. Perhaps one could think of attempts as simply 
presenting a very high ex ante risk of causing the threatened harm. Arguably, it is easier for the 
government to determine the likelihood that an attempt will produce the harm than it is for other, 
lower-probability risks. But we leave to Shavell more complete efforts to reconcile these two strands of 
his theory. 
72. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997) (discussing use of preventive measures 
in judgment-proof firms). 
73. Again, punishment for attempts may fall into a gray area between ex ante and ex post 
incentives. Nothing in our analysis turns on the exact terminology. 
74. See generally Murat C. Mungan, Wrongful Convictions and the Punishment of Attempts, 42 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 79 (2015). 
75. Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 44; Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics 
in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 834–36 (2012). 
76. We will immodestly mention that among the few existing examinations are Galle, supra note 
75, at 834–36; Brian Galle, The Economic Case for Rewards Over Imprisonment, 95 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3575031 [https://perma.cc/DJ4G-
KX2N]; Murat C. Mungan, Positive Sanctions Versus Imprisonment (George Mason Univ. L. & Econ. 
Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. 19-03, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3317552 [https://perma.cc/3V8H-K9UP]. 
77. Galle & Mungan, supra note 13.  
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behind our claim and the assumptions it rests on. We’ll then develop some 
important policy implications in Parts III and IV.  
A. The Costs of Subjectivity 
First of all, what do we mean by the “subjective valuation of the government’s 
incentive”? We mean that the instrument the government uses to sway the public, 
be it a thousand-dollar tax or a one-year jail sentence, can have different motivating 
effects depending on whom it is imposed on. This same variance can apply to 
rewards, too, such as patents or copyrights to encourage innovation or tax credits 
for building solar energy capacity.  
Here’s an example. Suppose Wolf Securities, Inc. is caught engaging in shady 
brokerage practices. Let’s say the SEC’s standard penalty for these practices is a 
one-year ban on selling securities directly to the public—a penalty known as 
“debarment.”78 At Wolf, which is dependent on direct-to-consumer pitches, the 
one-year ban will cause lost profits of $2 million or so, about forty percent of its 
usual net. Let’s take the same ban for Lamb, Inc., whose business is mostly aimed 
at institutional investors. Even with all else equal, the same one-year ban might cost 
Lamb only $1 million, twenty percent of its  
usual profits.  
Knowing that the expected penalty is a one-year ban, which firm will take 
more care to avoid shady dealings? Which will spend more training its brokers? The 
answer, of course, is Wolf. If Wolf, which after all deals more frequently with 
vulnerable individuals, is the greater threat to the public, this is an efficient 
difference, as we’ll soon see. But what if both Lamb and Wolf, on average, cause 
$1.5 million worth of consumer losses? Then the one-year ban misses the mark for 
both firms—overdeterring Wolf, underdeterring Lamb—even though its average 
value is spot on.  
As prior authors have noted, prison offers a more common example.79 Adam 
Kolber, John Bronsteen, Chris Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur (collectively, BBM) 
emphasize differences in physical conditions.80 The United States strives to make 
prison sentences uniform for each form of offense: everyone who sells five 
kilograms of cocaine is supposed to receive roughly the same federal sentence as 
everyone else, for instance.81 Yet some individuals will suffer much more from a 
prison sentence than others.82 Perhaps they are claustrophobes, perhaps they are 
 
78. Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities Violators Receive a Reprieve?, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1081, 1088–93 (2015). 
79. Kolber, supra note 5, at 190.  
80. Bronsteen et al., supra note 5, at 1046–55; Kolber, supra note 5, at 190. Even critics of BBM 
and Kolber agree that “[i]t would be foolish to deny that persons experience punishment differently.” 
Markel & Flanders, supra note 5, at 909. 
81. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2018). 
82. E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 158–82 (2013). 
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physically vulnerable, maybe they have a child who needs their care (and some will 
care more or less about their child’s well-being), or maybe they could have earned 
more at a lawful job if not behind bars. If defendants know this about themselves, 
then the vulnerable will be more deterred, and the hardened or the low-wage earners 
less deterred, by sentences of comparable length.83  
More technically, what these examples show is that government incentives 
whose subjective value varies can cause deadweight loss.84 As we reviewed in Part 
I, matching private cost to social benefit is the key goal for corrective regulation. If 
any given producer subjectively expects that her punishment will be less costly than 
the optimal price, she will overproduce the damaging good.85 If society relies on 
shame to police polluters, shameless manufacturers will freely emit toxins.86 
Likewise, those with subjective expectations that their personal costs will be higher 
than the government expects will be overdeterred. Threats of a lifetime ban from 
securities trading might lead a trader with unusually high expected earnings to 
overinvest in precautions, spending thousands of dollars on risk-reducing 
paperwork that would not be cost-justified from a social perspective.  
Crucially, variance can be damaging even if on average the expected costs of a 
nonmonetary sanction are exactly the same as a fine would be. We saw in Part I 
that the social cost of mispriced enforcement typically rises exponentially with the 
size of the mispricing: one large error is usually much more harmful than two 
middling ones. Under some basic assumptions, this principle implies that, of two 
penalties set at the exact same average expected cost, the one with higher variance 
is the worse policy.87 Here we mean variance in the mathematical sense, where 
variance is the sum of the deviations of each individual observation from the mean 
value.88  
Subjective valuation often pops up when regulators use incentives that aren’t 
priced in dollars, but dollar-based incentives can create variance too. In the standard 
 
83. We should emphasize the importance of the assumption that defendants know or anticipate 
that their subjective costs will differ from what the regulator expects. If both regulator and regulated 
have identical beliefs about the cost of a future incentive, the incentive will still operate as the regulator 
expects (at least until the regulated party experiences the incentive and updates its beliefs). Bronsteen 
et al., supra note 5, at 1060–62. 
84. Kolber, supra note 5, at 217–18; see also Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming  
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 
373 (1999) (making this point about imprecise shaming penalties). 
85. Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen, Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The 
Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, 31 LAW & POL’Y 161, 167 (2009). 
86. Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 373. 
87. More formally, Kaplow and Shavell show that, when government has only one policy 
instrument and can set only one price for every producer, it should choose a price that minimizes the 
sum of the squared distances between the price each individual producer faces and the socially optimal 
price for that individual. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 44, at 775–79. In a world with multiple possible 
price instruments, this same principle implies that government should choose the instrument with the 
least variance. Galle, supra note 71, at 1728. 
88. WILLIAM MENDENHALL, ROBERT J. BEAVER & BARBARA M. BEAVER, INTRODUCTION 
TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 60 (14th ed. 2013). 
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economic account of regulation, which we sketched in Part I, the regulator wants a 
polluter or other externality creator to “internalize” or take full account of the costs 
or benefits she creates for others. The standard model typically measures those 
costs or benefits in dollars.89 If my hobby creates widget sludge that causes my 
neighbors to incur a one-thousand-dollar plumber bill, theory says I should pay a 
one-thousand-dollar tax to engage in that hobby. The idea is I’ll only pay the tax if 
the hobby earns me more than one thousand dollars 
In some economic models, utility for this one thousand dollars could vary 
from person to person.90 Would I be willing to pay one thousand dollars for the joy 
of a making a nice sludge-covered widget? That will depend on a lot of things, but 
almost certainly one of them will be my wealth. If I have millions, I’ll happily fork 
over one thousand dollars for a jolly good widget.91 That is, if the precaution or 
benefit the subjects of regulation are supposed to undertake is not also denominated 
in dollars, dollar incentives can have unpredictable effects.92 The pain of paying one 
thousand dollars is very different if that is one week’s wages or one hour’s.93  
The general idea of variable subjective valuation, and our model describing it, 
also relates closely at least two other possible ways in which incentives can go 
wrong. As we mentioned before, Bebchuk and Kaplow argue that regulation can be 
inefficient when wrongdoers guess wrongly about the likelihood that they will be 
detected. Their scenario and ours have much in common.94 In both, the government 
has set an optimal expected incentive amount, but some actors believe that incentive 
is larger or smaller.  
 
89. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945 (2000).  
90. To repeat our disclaimer from the Introduction, many commentators would likely reject the 
suggestion that the utility cost of $1,000 should be treated as varying in a model of enforcement. The 
reason is that utility is itself measured in dollars. See Boadway, supra note 12, at 52–53 (describing the 
money-metric approach); Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 180–84. As implausible as this approach 
may seem to many readers, economist proponents view it as a less disabling assumption than the other 
challenges raised by interpersonal comparisons of utility. Id. at 190–94; Marc Fleurbaey, Equivalent 
Income, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY 453, 453–54 (Matthew 
D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., 2018). Others suggest money-metric utility is at least a useful 
approximation for social welfare. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 997. Economists recognize that 
this approach results in potentially severe redistribution in favor of the rich, but argue that this should 
be corrected through lump-sum corrective taxes.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 180–84, 186. As 
one Nobel-winning economist dryly notes, these transfers have never been observed in practice, Paul 
A. Samuelson, Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists 
Supporting Globalization, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 135, 144 (2004), but they nonetheless form a bedrock of 
standard analysis. We need not take a position on these debates here. 
91. See Ronen Perry & Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Income-Dependent Punitive Damages, 
95 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 856–57 (2018). Miriam Baer helpfully calls this the “translation problem.” 
Baer, supra note 5, at 13; see also Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, supra note 12, at 1701 (examining how 
willingness to pay can differ from dollars). 
92. Galle, supra note 75, at 817–19; Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 91, at 861. 
93. Blank, supra note 2, at 755–56. 
94. The difference, though, is that in their model, the regulator’s only response is to attempt to 
make enforcement more predictable. Since we consider many more sources of variation, regulators have 
many more potential solutions.  
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The third related case is one in which the regulated parties are wrong not about 
the likelihood that a sanction will be imposed but instead about their own subjective 
valuation of it. This is the scenario sketched by BBM: As they summarize, humans 
often mistakenly fail to anticipate our own resilience in adapting to new 
circumstances, and so we believe things will be worse (or, sometimes, better) than 
they turn out.95 Again, assuming that adaptation is not uniform, and that the 
government cannot adjust its policy to correct these misapprehensions, the result 
will be that some individuals will be more or less deterred than optimal. The 
difference is that here it is the regulated party that is wrong, not the government. 
Of course, it could happen that both the government and the regulated party 
wrongly project how much the party will value an incentive. But unless these two 
errors exactly offset, the result will still be some variation from the optimal point.  
Of course, a critical contributor to the inefficiency of a world in which 
subjective costs vary is that the government cannot readily measure and adjust for 
individual differences. For that reason, we emphasize that the problem we aim to 
address is unobservable or observed but uncorrectable variation. But this isn’t an 
important caveat, we think, because we believe that a great deal of subjective 
variation is uncorrectable. At a minimum, instances where government can’t 
account for variation present a number of interesting and important cases. 
To be sure, some adjustment is possible, and many enforcement systems 
include adjustment mechanisms of this kind. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allow 
downward departures for individuals whose incarceration would create serious 
family hardship or expose the individual to risk of unusually serious physical harm, 
for example.96  
One basic obstacle to this idea is that some adjustments are mathematically 
impossible. If the Guidelines recommend a $1 million fine, and a corporation is 
expected to suffer $2 million in additional idiosyncratic losses (say, because it 
depends on its good reputation), there is no Guidelines adjustment possible that 
will fully correct for the firm’s individual circumstances.  
Another difficulty is that most of the information the government needs to 
make these assessments is in the hands of the regulated party, who has obvious 
incentives to misrepresent it.97 In many cases, a rational party with subjectively high 
costs of being punished should expect that it will not be able to provide credible 
information that will convince the government to adjust its penalty downwards (or 
its rewards upwards).98 Likewise, producers with subjectively low susceptibility to 
 
95. Bronsteen et al., supra note 5, at 1060–61. 
96. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 81, §§ 5H1.4, .6; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 
373 (arguing that over time sentencing judges could learn to modulate Guidelines sentences to account 
for varying effects of shame). 
97. Paul J. Ferraro, Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for Environmental 
Services, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 810, 811 (2008); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and 
Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1665 (1999). 
98. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 20–40 (1975) (describing credibility problem in asymmetric information settings); 
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incentives are unlikely to volunteer that information.99 For instance, even if patent 
protection produces no incremental incentives to invent for academic researchers 
who love knowledge for its own sake, we suspect few will turn down the money if 
it’s offered to them. 
Another way to put this is that variance is a consequence of asymmetric 
information. In essence, variance in the subjective cost of punishment affects 
incentives to comply whenever the producer is likely to have better information 
about those subjective costs than the government does. For instance, the private 
party may know or suspect they won’t be affected by the government’s sanction, 
but the government is unaware it needs to up the sanction amount. The 
overwhelming consensus in the choice-of-instruments literature is that this 
government information deficit holds true most of the time.100  
It is thus here that we part ways with Kolber and Lott. Although we agree with 
Kolber, Lott, and BBM that subjective variation in the experience of punishment 
can lead to inefficiency, we are skeptical of arguments that this variation can often 
be individually corrected by the justice system.101 Though Kolber acknowledges that 
“cost and administrability concerns present powerful impediments to the creation 
of a highly individualized system of punishment calibration,”102 he nonetheless 
suggests that the existing structure of the legal system may be flexible enough to 
detect and account for personal experiences.103 The tort system, he notes, tries to 
measure pain and suffering damages.104 He adds that perhaps future advances, such 
as fMRI brain scanning, can help to identify individual mental states.105 
Science fiction aside,106 the costs of a system capable of such fine-grained 
measurements put enormous and undesirable pressures on a regulatory system.107 
 
Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and 
Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1769 (1990) (noting that workers cannot credibly disclose 
adverse information to employers). 
99. Baer, supra note 5, at 15. 
100. Fullerton et al., supra note 58, at 430; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 4. 
101. We agree with Kolber that a legal system should account for fact that “there is a great deal 
of variation in easily observable, objective features of our punishments that are largely ignored at 
sentencing.” Kolber, supra note 5, at 188. To the extent these differences can be cheaply and accurately 
accounted for, they should be. One way to understand our claim is that variance can be thought of as 
the degree of variation after cost-effective individualized adjustments are in place. We simply are 
skeptical that such adjustments will reduce variation meaningfully in many cases. 
 There also may be mechanisms the government can implement when it can observe subjective 
cost but only with some degree of error. E.g., Galle, supra note 71, at 1730–34. 
102. Kolber, supra note 5, at 226. 
103. See also Baer, supra note 5, at 12 (describing how courts attempt to account for 
distinctiveness of individual defendants). 
104. Kolber, supra note 5, at 219–20. But see Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 91, 
at 869–70. 
105. Kolber, supra note 5, at 220. 
106. Thus far, empirical analysis suggests even “big data” perform poorly in predicting key 
components of criminal procedure. See generally Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Assessing 
the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 489 (2019). 
107. Cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 12, at 224. 
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Individual adjustments allow for the play of potentially biased judgments, often to 
the detriment of socially marginalized groups. Further, one standard result in the 
economics of enforcement is that the cost of enforcement should be treated as 
equivalent to other portions of the marginal social damage caused by “pollution” or 
other regulated activities.108 So in a higher-cost criminal justice system, optimal 
sentences are longer.109  
Similarly, enforcement theory counsels that when it is costly to detect and 
punish each individual, it is optimal to decrease the frequency of detection and 
increase the punishment: instead of catching 100 offenders and giving them each a 
$100 fine, catch one person and give her a $10,000 dollar fine.110 Yet ratcheting up 
individual punishments puts a greater distance between “optimal” punishments and 
our sense of individual justice, and likely increases the costs of individual trials.111 It 
often forces the government into using second-best deterrence options for 
defendants who cannot be punished more.112 We cannot fine a defendant more 
money than she has, cannot sentence a human to more than one lifetime in prison. 
As punishments grow larger, we are more likely to hit these limits, making it more 
likely in turn that we must resort to incentive options that are otherwise less 
desirable but not subject to the same limits.113 If individual-adjustment systems are 
costly and yet still imperfect, they therefore produce the worst of all results.114  
Even if it were possible to fine-tune sentencing law, there surely are many 
other incentives that cannot practically achieve anything like full correction of 
existing disparities. How can the government know which cartoonists need a 
seventy-five-year copyright term to motivate their innovative doodling and which 
would be content with fifty?115 Which smokers will be motivated to kick their habit 
when they see disturbing images on the side of their cigarette pack and which will 
instead (as an Australian study found of a small subset of puffers) smoke more in 
 
108. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 430. 
109. The general public may also be unwilling to make the kinds of adjustments Kolber calls 
for. Id. at 447–48. For experimental evidence to that effect, see Josef Montag & Tomas Sobek, Should 
Paris Hilton Receive a Lighter Sentence Because She’s Rich? An Experimental Study, 103 KY. L.J. 95 (2015). 
110. Garoupa, supra note 47, at 268. 
111. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE 
L.J. 857, 881–82 (1984). 
112. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 410. 
113. Id. 
114. We would respond similarly to the potential counterargument that incentive systems will 
correct themselves. Arguably, defendants with a higher subjective cost of being punished will work 
harder to avoid detection and conviction, so that in equilibrium, the expected penalty is the same for 
all defendants. John Lott considers and rejects this possibility, albeit with back-of-the-envelope 
calculations. Lott, supra note 5, at 603. Even if expected penalties do equilibrate, variance in sanctions 
would still be wasteful because they cause wasteful expenditures on avoidance and litigation.  
115. See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation 
& Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1856–57, 1881–82 (2014) (discussing the informational 
demands of setting copyright policy when some inventors are inframarginal). 
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defiance of the government Big Brother?116 Even if we knew, how could we ensure 
that the defiant smokers alone don’t see the pictures on their packs?117 In short, 
regulators often must set mass policies that impact millions at a time, without any 
obvious method for assessing and modulating the impact on  
particular individuals.118  
Individual adjustments are also difficult because the modern state is too 
complex to be centralized. This means that many aspects of the subjective cost of 
an incentive will be under the control of separate regulators who may struggle to 
coordinate.119 The cost of a one-year debarment for a firm can vary not just because 
of its own inherent profitability, but also because of the tax rate the firm faces in 
all the jurisdictions it does business, the degree of anticompetitive scrutiny it faces, 
and so on. This is a well-known aspect of the “collateral sanctions” problem in 
criminal law, in which a conviction and sentence may trigger effects, such as 
deportation, that once triggered are outside the hands of judge or prosecutor.120 
Many consequences of enforcement, such as shame or reputational damage, may be 
imposed by private actors.121 While one actor tries to adjust a sanction in one 
direction to make it more uniform, others may be working in the opposite direction.  
None of this is to say that observing and correcting individual variations is 
impossible; the question is whether it is more efficient than the alternatives we shall 
propose. Indeed, the economic theory of price discrimination studies the 
mechanisms market actors can use to elicit subjective private costs, albeit usually at 
considerable cost.122 We have each written that in some circumstances regulators 
can design instruments to lessen the impact of limited information.123 Maybe one 
day “big data” techniques could gather everything knowable about an individual and 
use it to predict her subjective costs. But at what cost in time, computing power, 
and most crucially individual privacy?124 Each of these alternatives has serious limits, 
and so we think it is essential to examine whether there might be a better way.  
 
116. ESSENCE COMMC’NS, EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF GRAPHIC HEALTH 
WARNINGS ON TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING 57 (2018). 
117. Brian Galle, The Problem of Intra-Personal Cost, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
1, 53 (2018). 
118. Cf. Viscusi, supra note 11, at 609 (observing that it is difficult for government to regulate 
“decentralized behavior” directly); Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1689 (2015) (describing limitations on ability of tax system to offer  
individualized rates). 
119. Cf. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 499–500 (2017) 
(noting that “compartmentalized” justice system diffuses responsibility for harsh punishments). 
120. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
684–92 (2014); cf. Kolber, supra note 5, at 195–96 (noting that judges do not control bureau of prisons 
or parole boards). To be sure, though, judicial actors can shape collateral consequences through their 
choices of what to charge and what information to reveal in court. Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral 
Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200–02 (2015). 
121. Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 372. 
122. See STERNER & CORIA, supra note 43, at 168–69. 
123. Galle, supra note 71, at 1729–33. 
124. See supra note 20. 
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B. A Simple Solution: Minimizing Uncertainty (or Its Costs) 
If government knows that regulated parties vary in their sensitivity to a 
regulatory instrument, and government can’t make individual adjustments to correct 
for this variation, what should it do instead? Well, if the instrument is broken and 
can’t be fixed, try another one. That is, the simplest version of our answer is that 
regulators should try to choose instruments that would minimize the variance of 
individual responses. We’ll first defend that point, then add a couple of layers of 
nuance to it. 
Our claim is that social welfare is usually highest when government makes 
maximal use of the instrument with the least amount of variance in individual 
sensitivity.125 Even without math, the intuition for our result is straightforward. Not 
all instruments with varying responsiveness are equally bad. When an individual is 
more or less sensitive to the incentives a government offers, the result is 
mathematically no different than if the government had set an unvarying incentive 
too high or too low for that individual. As we’ve already seen, the social cost of 
government setting prices at the wrong level usually grows exponentially with the 
size of the mistake.126 
To be sure, there is a potential tradeoff between the size of the government’s 
mistakes and their number. Because large mistakes are worse than small ones, it 
usually is better to make many small mistakes rather than a few big ones, but that 
isn’t an iron rule.127  
The mathematical concept of variance captures this tradeoff. In technical 
terms, variance is the sum of the squared distance a group of numbers are from their 
mean value.128 Thus, a set of data with a few distant outliers will typically have a 
much larger variance than one with many observations close to the mean. Variance 
therefore is an excellent proxy for the social cost of government errors. Variance 
counts big “mistakes” or departures from the mean much more than small 
departures, just as the social planner is far more worried about big mistakes than 
small ones. So a policy that minimizes the variance of individual responses is also 
minimizing the social cost of government’s inability to correct for them.129  
We tweak this basic prescription to account for possible correlations. That is, 
the model we just described presumes that there is no correlation between a given 
producer’s subjective cost of a sanction and the social damage caused by that 
 
125. As we’ll explain shortly, we modify this claim in several cases, including most interestingly 
the one in which the regulated party’s subjective costs of being subject to one instrument are negatively 
correlated with the costs of another.  
126. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48. 
127. See Alan J. Auerbach, Comment, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 83, 86 (Henry J. Aaron, 
Leonard E. Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007) (“[A] lot of small tax wedges are better than a 
few large ones.”). 
128. MENDENHALL ET AL., supra note 88, at 60. 
129. As we said, this claim is mathematically quite similar to the well-known observation that 
projects with more certain benefits are preferable, ceteris paribus, to less certain ones. GRUBER, supra 
note 6, at 223. 
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producer. Sometimes the damage caused by externalities varies from producer to 
producer. Widget sludge might be more harmful to young children, and so locating 
a widget factory next to a day care center might be especially bad. Or, in our Wolf 
and Lamb example, Wolf faced higher subjective costs and also caused greater social 
damage.130 In those cases, what we’d want is a government policy that adjusted the 
price per unit of sludge to be higher for the day care–neighboring firm.131 If by 
chance firms that sit next to day care facilities happen to be those that would 
experience a higher cost, that might actually be a better result than if every firm paid 
the same amount.132 Our “tweak” is to recognize that in these situations variance is 
desirable. But in the usual course of things, we’d expect such happy accidents to be 
fairly rare.133 
Theories of “asymmetric regulation” offer an important exception to that 
rarity.134 In some cases, the factors that make a regulatory instrument have higher 
subjective costs are exactly the same factors that cause social harms in the first 
place.135 If so, there will be a strong correlation between the subjective price and 
the need for correction, making the high-variance policy instrument potentially 
more efficient than a more predictable alternative.136  
A classic example is default retirement savings plans.137 Behavioral economists 
argue that some people don’t save enough for retirement because they find filling 
out the requisite paperwork annoying.138 These same people, the economists say, 
probably would find it more burdensome to fill out annoying paperwork to escape 
the default retirement contribution.139 So the argument concludes that the costs of 
 
130. See STERNER & CORIA, supra note 43, at 148–49. 
131. Id. at 151. 
132. See Steven D. Levitt, Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of 
Prison Sentences Instead of Fines, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 181–82 (1997). 
133. Of course, regulators could calibrate their own behavior in order to align expected 
sanctions with expected harms. See Scott Baker & Alex Raskolnikov, Harmful, Harmless, and Beneficial 
Uncertainty in Law, 46 J. LEGIS. STUD. 281, 283 (2017) (describing reasons why punishment may be 
correlated with harm). 
134. The term originates with Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’ Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219, 1222 (2003). 
135. Id. 
136. Another potential example would be social stigma. It may be that society imposes greater 
stigma on individuals who are in a position to do the greatest harm so that variance in the stigmatizing 
effects of a conviction are efficient. Murat C. Mungan, On the Optimality of Sealing Criminal Records, 
and How It Relates to Adverse Selection, Productivity Reduction, and Stigma 3 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of 
L., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. 709, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2502919 
[https://perma.cc/DV2F-TTT2]. 
137. Camerer et al., supra note 134, at 1227–29. 
138. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 106–08 (Penguin Books rev. ed. 2009) (2008). We take no 
position here on whether these claims are either normatively or descriptively accurate. 
139. See id. at 110–11; John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, The 
Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167, 188 ( Jeffrey Brown, Jeffrey Liebman  
& David A. Wise eds., 2009). 
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opting out are highest for those people where the social damage (failure to save for 
retirement) is highest.140 If that is all correct, greater variance is useful, because it 
targets the instrument at the population where it can do the most good.  
Does this same logic also imply that variance is desirable when the 
government’s incentives are set at the wrong level? In other words, do our 
conclusions depend on the further assumption that government policy is optimal? 
No. Variance makes incentive systems worse, and this damage is even larger when 
the system is imperfect to begin with.  
To see this, imagine that the government wants us to build widgets, but it’s 
short of resources and so its widget-building rewards (favorable zoning for  
widget-producing businesses, say) are too small. With varying subjective value, some 
of the would-be widget makers will value zoning more than the average, bringing 
them to the optimal amount of widget production. But other businesses will value 
zoning less than the average. These companies will be even farther from the 
optimum than average. Once more, the social loss caused by these kinds of errors 
gets larger exponentially. The waste from under-incentivizing some businesses will 
outweigh the gains from getting others closer to the right level.141  
C. More Complex Solutions 
Although our basic advice to policy makers is to choose instruments with the 
smallest variance, there turns out to be a lot of different ways to get to that result. 
That’s nice, because oftentimes the world is too complicated for simple solutions. 
Another reason to consider multiple avenues to our result is that some have 
tradeoffs. Several of our options run contrary to the standard advice other 
economists offer, implying that minimizing variance may often produce costs as 
well as benefits. Where possible, policy makers will want to choose the route to 
minimal variance that delivers the best combination of gains and losses.  
1. Variance Engineering 
When we say that government should choose the least variant incentives, we 
don’t just mean that regulators should switch from, say, shaming to fines (more on 
that question in the next part), but also that government can shape the design of 
each incentive it employs to make that incentive less variant. There are probably 
countless ways to engineer variance, but we’ll highlight a few here.142 
 
140. Id. 
141. The argument we make in this sentence assumes that the distribution of errors is roughly 
symmetrical. It could instead be the case that the marginal costs of under- and overdeterrence are 
different. But that is another way of saying that the variance is correlated with the harm to be corrected. 
If the regulator sets incentives too low, and more parties over-value the incentive than undervalue it, 
then in fact there is a positive correlation between subjective value and social gains. We acknowledge 
that would be a scenario where variance can be efficient. 
142. Another notable option, set out by Baer, supra note 5, at 16–17, is to respond to variance 
using choices about policing (or other detection systems) instead of punishment. Baer’s argument, 
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Governments can potentially increase efficiency by avoiding incentives whose 
severity depends on uncorrectable physical characteristics of the regulated party. 
For instance, holding average deterrence constant, safer prisons should be more 
efficient. Inadequate medical care will predictably make prison a deeper suffering 
for the afflicted,143 but it is hard to say with specificity just how much worse off 
these prisoners are. What sentence equalizes the pain of a healthy inmate with one 
who develops serial kidney infections because he cannot obtain dialysis? Similarly, 
we know some prisoners are more or less vulnerable to physical abuse by others in 
the penal system,144 but measuring how this vulnerability should affect sentencing 
is challenging.145 In both cases, even leaving aside questions of morality and basic 
decency, it can be more economically efficient to better protect and care for 
prisoners so as to avoid the uncorrectable variance their vulnerabilities create.146  
Likewise, prison could be less alienating.147 Criminal defendants will vary 
widely in the depth of their connections to family, friends, their workplace, and 
society at large.148 Many American prison systems seem to aim intentionally at 
depriving prisoners of these ties or at best give no real thought to preserving 
them.149 While severing these essential elements of community is likely an intended 
component of a prison sentence, its extent will vary greatly and cannot be readily 
translated into higher or lower sentences for the less or more vulnerable.150 Further, 
 
which we find persuasive, is that some of the source of individual variation in responsiveness to 
threatened punishments is because of differences in how much people care about events far in the 
future. Four additional years of prison at the end of a long sentence is relatively meaningless to those 
whose “discount rate” is very high. Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent 
Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 657–58 (2007). By increasing policing, government can instead 
increase the likelihood of suffering a small near-term punishment, which should have more impact. 
143. Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eight Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 
912–14 (2009). 
144. Id. at 915–17. 
145. A thoughtful approach, albeit one from a retributivist frame rather than our economic one, 
is E. Lea Johnston, Modifying Unjust Sentences, 49 GA. L. REV. 433, 452–77 (2015). 
146. Again, our claim that lower variance improves efficiency is based on an assumption that 
the average deterrent effect of a given sentence does not change. If one year of time in a safe prison is 
less of a deterrent than one year in a cruel one, then sentences may need to be longer or more common 
in order to keep incentives at their optimal level. The added costs of detection or incarceration may 
exceed gains from reduced variance.  
147. Some readers may argue that danger and alienation are so endemic to the experience of 
incarceration that it would be preferable simply to do away with prisons. These “abolitionist” claims 
are beyond our scope here, but they may well be consistent with our argument.  
148. See David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from 
the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750 (2011) (arguing wide range of economic costs 
of incarceration across defendants is likely attributable to differences in earning capacity); cf. Cass  
R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303 (2007); Starr, supra note 11, 
at 104–05 (noting prison’s effects on “separation from family and friends[,] . . . loss of subsequent 
earnings, social stigma, and other disadvantages upon release”). 
149. Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793,  
811–15 (2011). 
150. See id. at 817–23, 836–39 (describing judicial struggles to account for impact of sentencing 
on defendants’ families); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the 
Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 178–80 (1996) (arguing that alternatives to incarceration 
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sentencing reductions for defendants with deeper community ties often amounts to 
lighter sentences for those with more successful careers—a potentially troubling 
disparity.151 From a variance perspective, it would be better instead if the prison 
system fostered and sustained existing relationships, and helped to replace 
prisoners’ lost opportunities to build such ties.152  
A third possibility is to better coordinate the legal aspects of overlapping 
incentives. As other writers have ably documented, “collateral” consequences 
plague the criminal justice system.153 A hailstorm of civil consequences follows most 
convictions, randomly striking some otherwise comparable defendants with 
consequences both dire—deportation, loss of parental custody, voting, and  
firearm-bearing restrictions—and absurd, such as being shorn of a license to cut 
hair.154 Because prosecutors typically cannot accurately assess these costs ex ante as 
well as defendants, allowing these consequences introduces unobserved subjective 
variance in deterrence.155 
A final possibility that deserves some consideration is the publicity that attends 
government enforcement. As we mentioned, many collateral consequences are 
imposed by private actors, not the government. The consensus in the  
corporate-compliance literature, for example, is that the reputational effects of 
being identified as a wrongdoer are on average many times more costly than the 
accompanying official sanctions.156 The value of a good reputation of course varies 
dramatically from firm to firm, with long-established and sterling brands typically 
standing to lose far more than an unknown start-up.157 An individual-adjustment 
approach might therefore impose smaller sentences on firms that suffer the greatest 
reputational harm. It is unlikely, however, that we’d want a regulatory policy that 
systematically imposed smaller official sanctions on high reputation parties. 
 
are likely a better option for preserving family relationships than modified prison sentences, but 
embracing both). 
151. See DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR  
PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 49–52 (2009) (arguing against 
modified sentences for most family conditions). For suggestive empirical evidence finding that 
wealthier defendants receive more downward departures, see David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and 
Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285,  
308–09 (2001). 
152. To repeat, this prescription assumes constant average deterrence, and might hold to a lesser 
degree or not at all if the costs of maintaining deterrence at the optimal level are substantial. 
153. Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and 
Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 233, 237–41 (2018); Jain, supra note 120, at 1206–07. 
154. Id. 
155. Cf. Lott, supra note 5, at 584 (arguing that total punishment may be too high if it fails to 
account for defendant’s lost earnings potential). 
156. Cary Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction to REGULATION AND REGULATORY 
PROCESSES,  at xi (Cary Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond 
Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENV’T 
L.J. 55, 117–28 (2003). 
157. Start-ups would like to have good reputations, but if they acquire a bad one, they just fold 
and . . . start up again. 
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Although the quality of a party’s reputation can often be roughly observed by 
regulators, it will usually still hold true that a person or firm knows better than the 
government the value of that reputation. Worse, the policy would invite corruption, 
licensing regulators to mete out lighter penalties for the powerful and influential.  
If variable reputational harms create inefficient incentives, and it is undesirable 
to adjust nonreputational sanctions in response, it could be optimal for government 
not to disclose violations it detects.158 The downside, of course, is that disclosure 
can provide valuable information to the public,159 but that cost could sometimes be 
small relative to the cost of varying sanctions.  
Consider, for instance, the common practice of sealing court records for 
offenders under age eighteen.160 The long-run reputational impact of a criminal 
record is hard to predict and highly varying, and the offender may have a better 
sense of the direction of the variance than the government—she may know, for 
instance, if she plans a career in a position of public trust. We might also think that 
people change and grow over time so that the informational value of an old 
conviction is minimal.161 We could say something similar about expungements and 
other mechanisms for removing public record of minor offenses from which the 
offender seems thoroughly rehabilitated.162  
On the flip side, many regulatory infractions should probably still be public. 
Some hazards can be easily detected by their users—the scalding-hot cup of coffee. 
Most cannot, even after a consumer has used the good many times.163 Does your 
credit card have a hidden fee buried deep in its disclosures? Go check; we’ll wait 
here.164 The informational value of enforcement is high, in other words. 
Information about individual enforcement events may not only help consumers to 
 
158. Mungan, supra note 136, at 2. 
159. Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 368–71. For analysis of the role information plays in the 
government’s choice between a guilty plea and other forms of settlement, see generally Cindy  
R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational and Collateral Effects of 
Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 
87 ( Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018). 
160. RIYA SAHA SHAH & LAUREN FINE, JUV. L. CTR., JUVENILE RECORDS: A NATIONAL 
REVIEW OF STATE LAWS ON CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING AND EXPUNGEMENT 9, 13–15 (2014), 
https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/national-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
942R-74FV]. 
161. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH 140, 144 (2013) (reporting consensus of literature that juvenile justice records cannot 
predict future likelihood of offending); Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, 
Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Short-Term Predictions of Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME  
& DELINQ. 64, 72–80 (2007) (finding little predictive value in most old offense records). 
162. Mungan, supra note 136, at 2. 
163. John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and 
Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 264–66, 285–90 (1991). 
164. Spoiler: It does. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157  
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26–56 (2008). For more recent evidence, see, for example, Benjamin J. Keys & Jialan 
Wang, Minimum Payments and Debt Paydown in Consumer Credit Cards, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 58, 59–60 
(2018) (finding that consumers respond less to less salient contract terms and that this costs  
them money).  
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avoid untrustworthy trade partners,165 but may also help to shape policy.166 Take 
the example, unfortunately not wholly hypothetical, of a financial regulator’s string 
of undisclosed settlements with predatory banks. Unable to observe the repeated 
predation, the public may fail to understand the importance of the underlying legal 
regime, leading to its slow erosion.167  
2. Smaller, More Frequent Incentives 
A similar set of intuitions drive our last major category of policy options. Here, 
we propose that regulators make incentives smaller and more common. Once more, 
this advice runs contrary to the standard account, and we acknowledge that there 
are potential tradeoffs in adopting our recommendation. 
In the standard model of enforcement sketched by Gary Becker, and then 
extended by Polinsky and Shavell, regulators should catch and punish only a few 
offenders.168 Since the expected penalty for wrongdoing is the product of the 
probability of detection times the penalty, this means that the few who are punished 
will face very high penalties.169 But, in the conventional account, punishing only a 
handful is more efficient because it saves on the costs of detecting and litigating 
with multiple defendants.170  
Becker’s account has some problems, as the economic literature later 
acknowledged.171 It calls to mind Shirley Jackson’s The Lottery: we have strong moral 
intuitions about equality, luck, and just punishments, which a scheme of maximal 
enforcement against only a few violates.172 And because humans are risk averse 
 
165. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 375, 380 (1999). 
166. Cf. Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 377–78 (suggesting that shaming penalties shape 
beliefs about wrongfulness of crime). 
167. See Nicholas Lemann, The Dangers of Undoing Dodd-Frank, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/07/the-dangers-of-undoing-dodd-frank [https:// 
perma.cc/4ZFN-9WTA]. 
168. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 420. Indeed, in some instances, the regulator does not 
even catch one person! 
 Polinsky and Shavell concede that Becker’s approach cannot be implemented perfectly when 
some defendants would lack resources to pay a fine. Id. For example, in a setting where government is 
limited to using a single instrument, the presence of wealth-limited defendants forces the regulator to 
under-deter lower wealth individuals. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines 
When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618, 620 (1991); see also Garoupa, supra 
note 47, at 270. We discuss the case in which regulators can add a second instrument, such as 
imprisonment, in more detail below.  
169. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 420. 
170. Id. 
171. A useful overview of the various situations in which minimizing detection may not be 
optimal is provided by Garoupa, supra note 47. 
172. Id. at 267. On the comparison to Shirley Jackson, see Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, 
Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315,  
348 (1984). 
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(more on that topic in a bit), a system that forces individuals to bear large risks is 
probably less efficient, all else equal.173  
The benefits of reduced detection costs may also be somewhat overstated in 
Becker’s vision. Detection costs seem trivial compared to the vast costs of crime 
and punishment. Still, we admit that at some point, detecting all crime is 
prohibitively expensive and not just in dollars. No one wants to live in a state of 
perpetual surveillance and suspicion.174 But the optimal amount of detection is likely 
greater than is implied by Becker’s simple equation. 
Nonetheless, many current legal institutions seem to reflect Beckerian 
thinking. For the most part, we prefer to find and punish unwanted outcomes after 
they have occurred, rather than deterring the much wider universe of acts that pose 
a risk of bad results.175 We therefore tend to rely on mechanisms such as sentence 
enhancements for attempted concealment, punitive damages in civil litigation, or 
treble damages in antitrust that expressly increase punishment to reflect failures  
to detect.176  
Our model offers a new reason to detect more and punish less, and therefore 
perhaps to prefer ex ante efforts to discourage risk over these devices. Suppose that 
regulators cannot reach the optimal level of deterrence with an unvarying 
instrument—say, if defendants cannot afford to pay the optimal penalty amount. In 
that case, government is compelled to rely on an additional set of  
varying instruments.  
One way to capture the intuition behind this result is that we expect that most 
of the time, the variance of an incentive is closely tied to its magnitude.177 Larger 
fines will cause more dramatic swings in an individual’s standard of living. Longer 
prison sentences make it more likely that those with unusual medical needs will 
experience some health crisis while behind bars. By reducing the magnitude of an 
incentive, we should reduce its variance. More frequent, and therefore smaller, 
awards should thus be more efficient, all else equal. 178  
 
173. Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 52–53; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff 
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 891 (1979). 
174. But see GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 376 (Penguin Classics ed. 1983) (1949) (“He loved Big 
Brother.”). 
175. Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful 
Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (2011). 
176. Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and 
Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 486, 488 ( Jennifer Arlen ed., 
2013). Alternately, we might use “technological” approaches that make concealment harder in the first 
place. Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1383–84 (2006). For 
discussion of whether it might be preferable to employ these other approaches, see id. at 1372–97.  
177. This is certainly the case in one of the scenarios related to our general framework: when 
individuals misestimate the likelihood, they will be caught. In that situation, as Bebchuk and Kaplow 
show, the variance of the expected sanction is directly tied to its magnitude. When you think you are 
twice as likely to get caught, the expected penalty is double whatever the penalty amount is. Bebchuk 
& Kaplow, supra note 51, at 367. 
178. Our point is even stronger in a world in which actors can take steps to conceal their 
conduct. Assuming that these “avoidance” activities are deadweight loss, Jacob Nussim & Avraham  
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As we said, this result could also support ex ante incentives. Ex ante incentives 
can be dramatically smaller than those that operate ex post, because ex ante 
incentives are applied to all the instances that risk the bad outcome, not just those 
bad outcomes that occur. So switching to an ex ante approach could be a way to 
increase frequency. Like many things in life, ex ante regulation does have 
tradeoffs,179 and we return in Part III to this tradeoff in more detail.  
Bringing more people into contact with the incentive system can reduce 
variance through another route, as well. Recall that, as Bebchuk and Kaplow 
showed, one way in which variance can arise is if actors are unsure of how likely 
they are to be caught (or, we’d add, how likely they are to win a prize contest).180 
To be sure, governments can—and in the real world, certainly do—attempt to 
influence the public’s perception of how frequent or diligent its enforcement efforts 
are.181 Possibly these information campaigns are more cost-effective than bringing 
additional enforcement actions. But information campaigns can backfire.182 Much 
evidence also suggests that individuals are bad at interpreting events with very low 
frequencies.183 So if enforcement events are more common, regulated parties may 
have better information about enforcement frequency. 
In a similar fashion, making incentives common instead of rare may allow 
individuals to more accurately predict their subjective value. One way incentives can 
go off kilter is if the government sets its incentive optimally, but the regulated parties 
wrongly anticipate that they will value the incentive more or less than average. 
Repeated interactions will typically help correct these errors.  
To be sure, there can be instances where systematic misperceptions are helpful 
to the regulator. If regulated parties think incentives are bigger than they actually 
are, a cash-strapped regulator can save money by making incentives smaller.184 This 
 
D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation Versus Ex-Post Punishment, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 45, 
45 (2008), their wastefulness is likely to rise exponentially with the size of the sanction, Galle, supra note 
117, at 50; cf. Garoupa, supra note 47, at 286. Small ex ante incentives thus can potentially reduce the 
social cost of avoidance overall. Further, increasing ex post punishments for defendants who have 
undertaken avoidance activities could actually worsen the problem: since the penalty is higher, 
defendants would have even larger incentives to avoid. Nussim & Tabbach, supra, at 46; Sanchirico, 
supra note 176, at 1367–68. More complex results are possible where avoidance responds more to 
frequency than to magnitude of punishments. Eric Langlais, Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some 
Paradoxical Arithmetic, 10 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 371, 372–82 (2008). 
179. See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan, Wrongful Convictions and the Punishment of Attempts, 42 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 79, 79–87 (2014). 
180. Bebchuk & Kaplow, supra note 51, at 366.  
181. See Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX 
REV. 1, 11–18 (2010) (analyzing use of tax enforcement announcements as a deterrence tool). 
182. The best-known example is probably P. Wesley Schultz, Jessica M. Nolan, Robert  
B. Cialdini, Noah J. Goldstein & Vladas Griskevicius, The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive 
Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCH. SCI. 429, 429–34 (2007) (reporting field experiment in which 
providing information about energy-use by neighbors sometimes increased energy usage). 
183. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 
70–83 (2002). 
184. Galle, supra note 55, at 92; Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable 
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1339–40 (2012). 
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is an example of the correlations between subjective price and social damage we 
analyzed earlier.185 When otherwise underdeterred defendants overestimate 
enforcement, variance is positively correlated with the harm that needs correcting. 
Finally, we should mention again in this context a point that emerges from the 
existing literature: using more frequent incentives allows the government to rely 
more on its best policy option.186 That is, suppose fines are the best choice but are 
limited by a defendant’s net worth. Optimally, we could fine one person $10 million, 
or 1,000 people $10,000. Almost certainly, the one person we catch will not have 
$10 million in her pocket, forcing us to resort to something other than fines to 
punish her. By catching 1,000 people, we are more likely to be able to use fines 
exclusively. 
3. Combinations of Incentives 
Another method regulators can use to reduce the variance of their incentive 
system is to use combinations of incentives, instead of relying on a single instrument 
alone. Our model suggests several distinct ways in which multiple instruments can 
potentially improve over one alone, assuming that the regulator has no perfectly 
unvarying instruments available.187 We’ll focus here on what we think is the most 
interesting of these: the possibility that two instruments might offset each  
other’s weaknesses. 
Before detailing that approach, we should first distinguish our proposals from 
an existing and well-known feature of the standard economic approach. As Polinsky 
and Shavell detail, regulators must use two or more instruments when the best 
available instrument can’t offer large enough incentives to achieve the optimum.188 
Recall that although Polinsky and Shavell favor fines over other criminal 
punishments, they acknowledge that most defendants cannot afford to pay fines 
large enough to provide optimal deterrence.189 In that case, they recommend that 
the government resort to its next best option, such as prison.190 What we propose 
instead is that, in the right circumstances, governments might deliberately make use 
of their second- or third-best options even before the most effective one has 
reached its maximum capacity.  
One reason to reach for a less efficient (setting aside variance) instrument is if 
regulated parties’ sensitivity to the second instrument is negatively correlated with 
 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 131–142. 
186. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 410. 
187. If the regulator has a perfectly predictable instrument available, our model predicts that 
utility is maximized by first exhausting that instrument before turning to others.  
188. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 411. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. This assumes that the additional deterrence provided by imprisonment justifies its cost. 
Id.; see Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 63. 
 More formally, Polinsky and Shavell describe one instrument as superior to another when the 
total social cost of achieving optimal deterrence with that instrument is lower. Polinsky & Shavell, supra 
note 22, at 419–20. 
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their sensitivity to the first.191 In other words, those who are unusually sensitive to 
Incentive A also tend to be unusually insensitive to Incentive B. In that case, it is 
theoretically possible to construct a weighted combination of the two 
instruments—a little bit of A, a little bit of B—that eliminates all variance. Indeed, 
weighted combinations of what might otherwise have been only the fourth- and 
fifth-best choices could conceivably outperform the usual first choice.  
A concrete example might be helpful. Individual brokers who abuse their 
customers’ trust can be both fined and also see their license to sell securities 
suspended for a fixed time period.192 These two penalties may well be negatively 
correlated for many defendants.193 The more lucrative a dealer expects her business 
to be, the more she has to lose with each day she is sidelined. She also can likely 
borrow more cheaply, making it easier for her to pay off fines and still run her 
business. Thus, suspensions hurt her more than average, while fines hurt her less. 
By combining fines with suspension, the SEC might reduce the extent to which 
either one of these alone would tend to overdeter some dealers while  
underdeterring others.194  
Combinations of instruments might have some downsides, however. For one, 
obviously, it might be more expensive to administer two or more distinct incentive 
systems.195 Unless the same detection and enforcement system applies to both 
incentives simultaneously, dual-instrument approaches go in the face of Becker’s 
advice: save on enforcement by using larger penalties. Dual-instrument tactics might 
be most appealing when Becker’s approach is already constrained by other factors, 
such as a relatively low “ceiling” on the first-choice instrument; again, think of fines 
imposed on illiquid defendants. 
D. Potential Objections 
One possible criticism of our model is that we assume government can actually 
set an optimal level of the regulated activity. Many critics of the theory of optimal 
regulation argue government cannot have enough information even about publicly 
observable data, such as the harm caused by a regulated activity, to set the optimum 
accurately.196 “Who knows how much damage global warming really will cause in 
 
191. This argument is akin to, but broader than, Shavell’s discussion of pairs of instruments 
where each is practical only for distinct subsections of the population. Shavell, supra note 68, at  
263–64; see also Paul Lehmann, Justifying a Policy Mix for Pollution Control: A Review of Economic 
Literature, 26 J. ECON. SURVS. 71, 80–86 (2012) (describing how instruments with differing transaction 
or monitoring costs for different settings can be complementary). 
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (suspension). Debarment sanctions are often waived, however. 
Velikonja, supra note 78, at 1118–32. 
193. See Lott, supra note 5, at 585.  
194. Again, we assume the SEC cannot fully forecast the dealer’s expected per-day profits or 
net wealth, which would prevent it from correcting the resulting variance in either instrument.  
195. Cf. David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework 
for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 32–34 (2014) (discussing 
overhead costs of implementing multiple taxes). 
196. E.g., THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE 31–32 (2017). 
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the end?” these critics might ask. If so, do we care about variance in the  
incentive amount? 
Assuming that we regulate at all, variance still matters. One of optimal theory’s 
answers to the problem of low information is what we’ll call the Eagle Scout 
method: dead reckoning.197 The Eagle Scout doesn’t always know where the next 
campground is, but he (or, recently, she) has a compass and knows its direction. 
Similarly, often regulators might not know precisely the optimal level of, say, carbon 
in atmosphere.198 But we have a very good sense that current levels are far too high. 
Just about any policy we can implement will move us in the right direction.199 
It’s still important to minimize variance when using the Eagle Scout method. 
It’s true that with highly variant incentives, some regulated parties will end up even 
closer to the optimum than others (assuming we are so far from optimum that no 
one will overshoot). But as we’ve mentioned already, the cost of these 
improvements is that others will lag even farther from the ideal point than the 
average. These laggards often do more harm than the highly responsive parties  
do good.  
A second possible objection is that our proposal to limit variance is impossible 
to implement, because variance is unobservable. We argue that government usually 
cannot observe the subjective valuation of any particular person or firm subject to 
regulation. What makes us think that the regulator can know how much subjective 
valuation varies in the whole population? Isn’t the population data just the sum of 
unobservable individual results? 
An even stronger form of the objection might posit that the subjective 
valuation problem throws the whole project of government regulation into 
question.200 Economists have argued that the government’s information problem 
can usually be solved by observation,201 and subjective valuation might interfere 
with accurate observations. As we’ve seen, optimal regulation requires data on the 
private costs of compliance, which are usually not directly observable. In the 
standard account, though, government can infer private costs by using price 
instruments.202 If there is an inevitable $100 tax on emitting carbon, and a factory 
 
197. William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 
307–08, 319 (1972). 
198. Id. at 307–08. 
199. Id. at 308. This may no longer be true for some pollutants, of course, but economic analysis 
still provides “at least a rough sense of the relative magnitudes at stake.” Cropper & Oates, supra note 
7, at 730. 
200. This is not a hypothetical. Very respected commentators, such as Alan Schwartz of Yale 
Law School, have raised a version of this information argument as a reason to reject “nudges” and other 
kinds of regulatory interventions. Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1377–78 (2015); Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444,  
445–48 (2007). 
201. See supra text accompanying note 199. 
202. Fullerton et al., supra note 58, at 430. 
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chooses to keep polluting, we can infer that it must cost more than $100 to abate a 
unit of carbon at that factory.203  
The strong form of the objection argues that subjective value would make this 
simple inference problematic.204 Suppose that the government’s instrument is not a 
$100 per ton tax, but instead a one-week ban on production. What can we infer 
from a factory’s decision to emit a ton of carbon? We know that the cost of the 
one-week ban must be less than the cost of preventing the carbon emission. But is 
the cost of the ban one dollar and the cost of carbon abatement two dollars? Two 
hundred dollars and $300, respectively? Once we introduce uncertainty about the 
price the government is offering regulated parties, the objector might argue, we no 
longer can be certain that we are learning private costs of compliance.205 Yet private 
costs of compliance are vital to deciding whether regulation is cost justified.  
We have two main responses to the weak form of the objection. First, 
government can simply pay for good data, such as by rewarding whistleblowers, or 
acquire it through audit.206 In addition, it is easier to measure population- or 
industry-level data than it is to measure the same outcomes on an individual level.207 
Many factors contribute to that difference. Just as a statistical matter, the law of 
large numbers dictates that predictions about groups will always be more reliable 
than predictions about individuals.208  
Many prosaic data-collection practicalities also make population data more 
reliable. In the United States, tax and census data provide in-depth snapshots of 
private behavior, without revealing details about any individual.209 How? While 
firms are reluctant to disclose data on their private cost structures in ways that are 
individually identifiable, they often will readily respond to anonymous industry-wide 
surveys.210 The firm doesn’t want to give its competitors or regulators detailed 
 
203. Id. 
204. Schwartz, supra note 200, at 1377–78. 
205. See Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral Age, 125 
YALE L.J. 226, 246–47 (2015) (describing this potential problem). 
206. See Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 299; Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, 
Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2038 (2002) 
(“In undertaking prospective assessments of the costs that will likely result from proposed rules, 
agencies typically possess fairly broad-ranging powers to conduct investigations of existing facilities and 
to audit company financial records.”). 
207. See Baer, supra note 5, at 16 (making this point about policing data). 
208. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 1042–43 (6th ed. 2008). 
209. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 10.5.1 (2018); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., A HISTORY OF CENSUS PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, 
https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/history-privacy-protection102019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3BSQ-H6JP] ( last visited Nov. 8, 2020). 
210. Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 299; McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 206, at 2045. 
But see id. at 2029, 2038 (noting that self-reported cost information in one survey, in which firms were 
not required to provide any supporting documentation, was considerably higher than  
government estimates). 
 This empirical observation can also be explained through basic game theory. In general, firms do 
not want to disclose their subjective costs because those with low subjective costs will likely be punished 
more, while those that claim high subjective costs will likely not be believed. Coglianese et al., supra note 
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information about itself, but this danger doesn’t really arise when the publicly 
reported data will be aggregated together with many other firms.211 At the same 
time, firms typically benefit from and want to support information systems that 
collect information about their industry as a whole, as these offer them guidance 
about whether their own costs and processes are over- or underperforming the 
market.212 Indeed, firms regularly pay management consultants to provide these 
kinds of data.213  
There is more to be said about the strong form of the objection, but in many 
ways, we have already said it elsewhere. As Galle discusses at length in earlier 
projects, there are many settings in which regulators confront the problem of 
potential uncertainty about private costs of compliance and many sets of common 
solutions.214 Among others, regulators can run small-scale experiments or can use 
statistical techniques to extrapolate information about firms with less observable 
data from those whose data are more easily measured.215 For example, regulators 
can reliably observe compliance costs for firms whose subjective valuation of a 
regulatory instrument is known to be relatively predictable.216 Using well-known 
instrumental-variables statistical approaches, regulators can compare the common 
traits of the predictable and unpredictable firms to extrapolate unpredictable firms’ 
likely costs.217  
III. AN APPLICATION: THIS IS FINE? 
To show the theoretical and practical significance of our contribution, we now 
want to apply our theory to one of the bedrock results in the modern economics of 
crime. We mentioned in Section I.C that it’s a well-established principle that 
regulators should prioritize fines over other alternatives. Of all the incentives 
 
18, at 288–89. Firms may desire that their industry collectively will report high costs, so that sanctions 
will be lower in the future. But firms face a collective action problem in maintaining silence: silence 
provides positive externalities to rival firms. Id. at 290–92; Galle, supra note 75, at 822–23. If silence is 
costly, therefore, firms will have a tendency to disclose. Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 292. For 
instance, inflating cost reports is likely to carry some risk of detection, and probably some penalty for 
lying. Maintaining a reputation for honesty is very important to firms with long-term relationships to 
regulators. Id. at 311, 333–34. Alternately, disclosing might provide an opportunity to hurt rivals, as in 
the famous case of the tobacco litigation of the 1990s. Id. at 293. If firms even suspect that rivals might 
disclose, they have an incentive to disclose first to get the most credit from the government—a classic 
prisoner’s dilemma. Id. at 295. Where the government offers no inducements and allows unverified ad 
hoc estimates, however, it may well observe inflated costs. 
211. Coglianese et al., supra note 18, at 299. 
212. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1357–58 (1999) (summarizing positive externalities from 
firm financial disclosures). 
213. Andreas Werr, Knowledge Management and Management Consulting, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING 247, 248 (Matthias Kipping & Timothy Clark  
eds., 2012). 
214. Galle, supra note 117, at 21–29. 
215. Id. at 25–29. 
216. Goldin, supra note 205, at 260–69. 
217. Id. 
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governments can offer, fines (or, in a civil context, tort judgments) are said to offer 
better information, and, crucially, to make the best use of society’s resources.218 
That is, although both fines and prison can make a defendant regret her choices, 
the fine transfers resources to other productive uses, while prison simply  
imposes suffering.  
Our model offers some additional considerations. In some cases, these added 
considerations will weigh against fines, while in others they suggest we should use 
fines even more than standard theory recommends. For risk-averse parties, we 
argue, fines can be a less desirable option, while the reverse is generally true of 
regulated parties who are risk neutral.219  
Who is risk-averse? Typically, we think of most humans as risk-averse when 
making financial decisions, unless they are fully insured against any bad outcome.220 
Risk aversion is another way of saying that people prefer the average of a set of 
uncertain outcomes to the uncertain prospect itself. That is, they like to avoid 
extreme outcomes that may be generated by uncertain prospects. Suppose you have 
$100,000. Would you stake $99,000 on one flip of the coin? Most would say no. 
Winning would be nice, almost doubling your wealth. But losing would be ruinous. 
This is how diminishing marginal utility leads to risk aversion: you’d rather have 
$100,000 than a fifty-fifty chance of $199,000 or $1,000.221  
Insurance and economically similar strategies, such as hedging, help to relieve 
us of risk aversion,222 but insurance against regulatory incentives is hardly 
universal.223 For one, many insurers refuse to write policies that shield their 
customers from penalties for intentional acts.224 Even when enforcement is 
 
218. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 410, 420. 
219. We should distinguish our account from the familiar point that risk aversion makes 
probabilistic enforcement (enforcement against less than every wrongdoer) socially costly because 
individuals dislike bearing risk. Garoupa, supra note 47, at 278–79; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22. 
That analysis assumes that risk aversion is either uniform across the population or is fully observable, 
and that the regulator can optimize in response; we emphasize the additional deadweight loss that results 
when the regulator cannot observe individual variation in risk aversion. 
220. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 322–23. 
221. Id. Here, the term ‘diminishing marginal utility’ refers to a person’s  
von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility. vNM utility is used for purposes of representing a person’s 
decision-making under uncertainty. A person’s utility over objects and uncertain prospects (i.e., his 
expected utility) is an ordinal concept. Thus, the existence of diminishing marginal (vNM) utility does 
not, and cannot, on its own, imply that a person’s expected utility as it enters the social welfare calculus 
(which requires cardinal inputs) possesses diminishing returns. See, e.g., JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES 
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 145–47 (1996) (discussing this and related issues in preference aggregation). 
However, there seems to be a consensus in legal scholarship of using a social welfare function to which 
people’s utilities enter with diminishing returns whenever they possess diminishing vNM utility. Thus, 
we follow this convention here. 
222. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 324–25. 
223. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 229 (2012). An important exception is “environmental impairment 
liability” insurance. Id. at 225–26. 
224. Peter Kochenburger, Liability Insurance and Gun Violence, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1265,  
1288–92 (2014); Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 739–40 (2012). 
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triggered by carelessness, insurance markets may fail to offer affordable coverage 
because of adverse selection and moral hazard.225 Further, insurance law often will 
prohibit contracts to insure against government penalties as contrary to public 
policy, though of course a government that preferred risk-neutral regulated parties 
could repeal these prohibitions.226 For that matter, a government that really wants 
parties to be risk neutral could also make insurance mandatory, as some have 
proposed for intentional torts.227  
In contrast, we typically think of most widely held firms as risk-neutral, 
because the firm’s investors can usually diversify away any firm-specific (and, often, 
industry-specific) risk.228 But firms are run by humans, and the costs of contracting 
to align these humans with the interests of risk-neutral investors may sometimes 
leave managers still somewhat risk-averse.229 
A. Varying Utility of a Dollar, or, Regulating Humans 
In some models of well-being, fines may not be the optimal instrument for 
regulating uninsured humans because they lead to different burdens for different 
people.230 Even if regulators can set a fine amount at the level that optimally 
 
225. That is, insurance markets can fail when the insured has more information about its risks 
than the insurer, or when the insured can opportunistically increase the insurance payout. GRUBER, 
supra note 6, at 325–33. 
226. Swedloff, supra note 224, at 739–40. 
227. Id. at 759; Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 152 (2001). 
228. Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE 
L.J. 857, 865 (1984). 
229. Id. at 879; Li-Ming Han, Managerial Compensation and Corporate Demand for Insurance, 63 
J. RISK & INS. 381, 382 (1996). But see Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate 
Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541, 542–43 (2009) (arguing that firms might buy insurance 
because of demands of counter-parties, not just manager preferences). For another theory of risk-averse 
firms, see Murat C. Mungan, Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under 
Risk-Aversion, 15 REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2019).  
 Similarly, to the extent that judgments against firms are borne by individuals other than 
diversified shareholders, those individuals may be able to exert influence to make the firm avoid risk. 
Cf. Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax System?, 
65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525 (2010) (explaining that economic burden of tort judgments can fall 
on a variety of those connected to a firm); Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 91; 
Kraakman, supra note 228, at 882 (suggesting that impacts on firm employees may limit penalties 
regulators will impose on the firm). 
230. Once more, we caution that many economic modelers would instead simply measure utility 
in dollars, which would lead them to conclude that all dollar-denominated incentives have equal utility 
effects for all individuals. Our discussion here is intended for those who would opt for a different 
model. We note, though, that it appears some of those who prefer money-metric utility would account 
for diminishing marginal utility by allowing risk aversion to enter the utility function, such as by 
translating risky payoffs into “certainty-equivalent income.” Fleurbaey, supra note 90, at 462. 
 Our discussion can also be readily translated into terms of “welfare weights.” Jean Drèze  
& Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 909, 
930 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 1987); see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 59, at 4. Some 
economists who employ “money-metric utility,” see, e.g., Boadway, supra note 12, at 52, will adjust 
measured social costs and benefits to reflect social preferences for distribution, which usually reflect 
the diminishing marginal utility of money. Our argument can be understood as a claim that individual 
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incentivizes the average person, this same amount will over- or undermotivate most 
of the population.231 We have powerful intuitions that this is true. Ask the drivers 
of Ferguson, Missouri. Fines that would be a nuisance to middle-class payers have 
deprived poorer families of their cars, and in turn their livelihoods and ultimately 
their homes.232  
The “day fines” imposed by some European countries, and the  
wealth-adjusted punitive damages proposed by some scholars, improve matters but 
are no cure-all.233 A day fine is not a fixed amount but instead is simply the income 
earned by the defendant in one (or more) day’s work.234 Scholarly proposals would 
adapt this approach to civil litigation, allowing plaintiffs to collect more or less from 
defendants who would not be optimally deterred by a punitive damages award 
calibrated to the wealth of the average defendant.235  
While these approaches probably reduce the variability of the welfare impact 
of a monetary incentive, they hardly eliminate it. For one, two individuals with 
identical wealth levels can have very different responses to money.236 The utility 
cost of a dollar varies depending on the payer’s wealth, but this relationship is not 
automatic or mathematical: some poor fine payers will be able to adapt to their new 
hardship, while some wealthy payers may cling fiercely to every dollar.237  
Another uncertainty relates to time. A fine that looks big relative to current 
income may be trivial if the defendant has substantial savings or can easily borrow 
against future earnings.238 Put another way, the utility of a dollar arguably depends 
on a person’s lifetime wealth, not their wealth at any one moment.239  
Already-existing wealth is somewhat measurable, but we don’t know how long a life 
 
welfare weights are measured with uncertainty. Cf. id. at 71–72 (arguing that uncertain project benefits 
cause utility losses for risk-averse individuals). 
231. This is roughly the same problem as the well-known issue in cost-benefit analysis that 
“willingness to pay” will vary by household wealth. Bronsteen et al., supra note 11, at 1652–53. 
232. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 120, at 686. 
233. Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 91, at 862–63; Alec Schierenbeck, The 
Constitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1869, 1876–79 (2018). 
234. Id. 
235. Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 91, at 837. 
236. For example, individuals may have varying preferences about how to use their wealth, and 
so the utility value of wealth may vary depending on the prices of the preferred goods. These prices can 
themselves be endogenous to (caused by) the policies whose effects we are trying to measure. See 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 996–97. 
237. Bronsteen et al., supra note 11, at 1654–56. See generally Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., 
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952) (noting empirical uncertainties 
behind assumptions of diminishing marginal utility). 
238. Nicholas Bull, Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Who Pays Broad-Based Energy 
Taxes? Computing Lifetime and Regional Incidence, 15 ENERGY J. 145, 147 (1994); Don Fullerton  
& Diane Lim Rogers, Lifetime Versus Annual Perspectives on Tax Incidence, 44 NAT’L TAX J. 277,  
277–78 (1991).  
239. Fleurbaey, supra note 90, at 457. 
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the defendant will need her savings to support herself over, changes to her potential 
needs or earning capacity, and so on.240  
Worse, accurately measuring borrowing capacity is far more uncertain, as that 
turns not only on future events but also on an individual’s present access to credit 
or insurance products.241 Compounding all this, individuals vary in their cognitive 
capacity to save or borrow—for instance, evidence suggests some households 
impulsively overconsume when they have access to new resources.242 Thus even 
two people with identical lifetime incomes may have very different utility from a 
dollar in any given time period, depending on how efficiently each manages to 
spread their consumption over time.243  
Finally, as Kaplow and Shavell have observed, adjusting payments to reflect 
the subject’s wealth in effect imposes a wealth tax.244 That is, if individuals or firms 
know that holding more resources will subject them to greater liability, they will 
(marginally) prefer to have less wealth. Businesses, for instance, might be 
encouraged to structure themselves as series of shell organizations in order to cabin 
off assets from claimants.245 Wealth adjustments, in short, create a tradeoff between 
deterrence and unwanted distortions, with the result usually being that the optimal 
incentive allows for some degree of underdeterrence.246  
As a result, fines or their equivalents are not self-evidently the best policy 
instrument for regulating humans. Although fines may be the stronger choice on 
some dimensions, these advantages have to be traded off against the possibility that 
the variance of a fine is larger than the variance of other choices. Of course, it could 
 
240. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 23–24 
(2008); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745,  
772–73 (2007). 
241. We could perhaps impose fines based on what we believe the defendant’s capacity to earn 
will be in the future, but that approach would in effect chain many defendants to the path that offers 
them the highest earnings. For these reasons—uncertainty and discomfort with what amounts to wage 
slavery—theorists have long rejected the otherwise appealing notion of imposing taxes based on earning 
potential. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1154–72 (2006) (summarizing 
and examining arguments against taxes on potential income). 
242. Keith Marzilli Ericson & David Laibson, Intertemporal Choice, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 2, 25–26 (B. Douglas Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna & David Laibson  
eds., 2019). 
243. Galle has previously argued that, despite the difficulties of lifetime comparisons, 
household wealth should still be a basis on which we judge the fairness of tax and transfer systems. He 
claims that wealth comparisons measured over shorter periods of time are more practical, while still 
being morally and economically important. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the 
Poor? Shortsighted Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33, 89–95 
(2010). Mungan takes no position on these questions. 
244. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 672–73 (1994). 
245. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 69, at 1299; Perry & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 
91, at 857; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1927 (1991) (summarizing empirical evidence that this occurs). 
246. A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1471, 1486 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). 
First to Printer_Galle & Mungan.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/17/20  12:56 PM 
376 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:337 
also transpire that despite its variance a fine is still less variant than its alternatives. 
We discuss that possibility in more detail in Section III.B. 
Before moving on, though, we want to emphasize that our observations about 
fines here can also be applied to other instruments that are ultimately delivered in 
dollars. For example, in the intellectual property literature, there is debate over 
which of grants, patents, or other incentives are the best way to encourage 
innovation.247 The varying utility value of a research grant might undermine its 
efficiency, at least if the primary target is individual inventors.  
On the other hand, a grant may well offer less variance than a patent, its 
primary rival. Like the grant, the patent ultimately pays off in dollars—it is simply a 
temporary monopoly allowing its holder to charge prices above the competitive 
equilibrium price.248 But the amount of dollars the patent pays, and its timing, are 
less certain than with grants. Although the payoff from a patent depends in part on 
how much the public will pay, and thus arguably the social worth of the invention,249 
the patent’s worth could also fluctuate depending on the marketing skill of its 
holders, the willingness of trolls or competitors to sue, and uncertainty about the 
scope and validity of the patent.250 These extraneous factors make the patent’s dollar 
value less sure to match its social value. Of course, grants have the problem that the 
grant awarder has to figure out how to measure social value, and this too can 
introduce errors.251 Our only point is that the literature has so far emphasized the 
uncertainty of grants without fully recognizing the similar uncertainty of patents.252  
B. Risk Neutrality, or, Regulating Firms 
Our model has very different implications for the regulation of risk-neutral 
actors. First, we tend to confirm the conventional wisdom. By definition, for any 
given risk-neutral party, all dollars have equal value.253 Fines and other  
 
247. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern 
eds., 2002) (comparing intellectual property and alternative incentive mechanisms, namely prizes and 
procurement contracts); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and 
Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983) (same). 
248. Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44  
J.L. & ECON. 525, 529 (2001). 
249. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 247, at 54–55; Wright, supra note 247, at 703. 
250. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92  
TEX. L. REV. 303, 329–30 (2013). 
251. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 247, at 54–55; Wright, supra note 247, at 703. 
252. Critics do observe that willingness to pay for a patented product is not always a good 
measure of its social benefits. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the 
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1942 (2013). 
 As other writers have noted, it is possible to design mechanisms that combine aspects of grants 
and patents to blur the distinction between them. E.g., Daniel Jacob Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 548 (2019). To these authors, we would urge 
consideration of the variability of the resulting subjective value of incentives to inventors. 
253. That is, the definition of risk neutrality is that the party’s utility of adding or losing each 
dollar does not vary with the number of dollars gained or lost. Thus, the party’s wealth is irrelevant, and 
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dollar-denominated incentives would thus seem to be among the least variant of 
any possible instrument. If minimizing variance is important, as we argue it is, then 
fines are even more appealing as a regulatory instrument than prior  
analysis suggests.254 
But our model does more than just confirm the usefulness of fines. We offer 
a new criterion for choosing between instruments that the standard account would 
have treated as indistinguishable. Remember that the existing case for fines is that 
they are ex post and that they transfer, rather than waste, the cost imposed on the 
regulated party. A number of other instruments share these two central features. 
For example, consider debarments and similar penalties, which revoke the party’s 
right to do business for some period of time. In a reasonably competitive industry, 
the business opportunities lost by the sanctioned party will be claimed by rivals, 
enriching them at the party’s expense.255 Prior law enforcement literature has thus 
far had little to teach us about how to choose between fines and debarment.  
In contrast, our analysis suggests fines are usually preferable to debarment. As 
we sketched earlier, the expected costs of being out of business are probably 
somewhat known to the regulated party but likely cannot be measured as precisely 
by the regulator. Debarment thus introduces variance that would not be present in 
a fine of equivalent expected cost.  
Another way in which we add to the prevailing account is in helping planners 
to decide how much effort they should spend on detection and enforcement. This 
argument takes a few steps. Basically, the bigger the advantage that the regulator’s 
best available instrument has over the next-best choice, the harder the regulator 
should work to try to detect and punish (or, similarly, to entice and reward) the 
parties it wants to incentivize—holding the expected cost of punishment constant. 
That is, we should punish more often in smaller increments. Our theory suggests 
that the gap between fines and the next best instrument may well be wider than 
other theorists have appreciated. If so, we should be detecting and imposing fines 
on more offenders. 
To unpack this point a bit more, let’s review the regulator’s decision about 
how often to punish. A system that only has to detect one violator is probably 
 
cannot be a source of difference between parties. We concede that in theory, two risk-neutral actors 
could assign varying values to a dollar for reasons other than wealth. For instance, incentives might 
have symbolic value, and this symbolism might be tied to the size of the dollar incentive. But we are 
unaware of any empirical evidence that differences of this kind are common or of significant magnitude.  
254. We note that we take no view on the question whether deterrence is the best approach to 
ensuring corporate compliance with law, or whether other modes such as developing a robust 
compliance culture might be equally as or more effective. For an argument for the latter, see Tom  
R. Tyler, Psychology and the Deterrence of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE 
CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 11, 11 ( Jennifer Arlen ed. 2018). For empirical evidence 
supportive of Tyler’s view, see generally Brian Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence 
from Adoption of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS  
& MGMT. 532 (2017). 
255. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 365–66 (1998) (stating that entry 
of new firms reduces competitor profits). 
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cheaper than one that tries to find thousands. But the expected cost of an incentive 
is its cost times the likelihood that it will be imposed. So, if we only detect one 
wrongdoer, the penalty must be thousands of times higher. Especially in the case of 
fines, it will often be impossible to meaningfully impose fines of such magnitudes, 
since the defendant won’t be able to afford to pay. We say that the regulatory 
instrument has been “exhausted” when it is set at such a high level that further 
increases have no marginal effect.  
The possibility of exhaustion thus presents regulators with a trade-off. If they 
want to spend less on detection and enforcement costs, the penalty will have to be 
bigger, which means that they may well have to switch away from their first-best 
instrument and turn to others that are not as efficient. The optimal combination of 
instrument choice and frequency of detection balances these two factors against one 
another. The worse the second-best instrument is relative to the first, the more 
important it is to “max out” the better instrument, bringing it just to the point of 
exhaustion, but no further.256 If the better instrument is easily exhausted, we’ll want 
to keep each individual’s penalty at just this low level. To maintain the expected cost 
of the sanction at a steady point, we have to catch more people. Therefore, the 
bigger the gap between the best and next best choice, the more the regulator should 
spend on detection.  
This brings us back to our point about fines. We’ve shown that the gap 
between fines and other options is wider than the existing literature claims. Thus 
the optimal balancing point between detection costs and exhaustion should tip 
farther towards detection costs; exhausting the possibility of a fine is worse than 
others have thought, because fines are a stronger choice.  
While much of our analysis is thus supportive of the use of fines, in one 
important case the argument we just laid out instead cuts in favor of ex ante taxes 
over fines. Remember from Part I that the main difference between fines and taxes 
is timing: the fine is imposed after the bad act occurs, while the tax is imposed 
beforehand on behavior that presents a risk of the bad outcome (think of the 
difference between a ticket for speeding and a tort suit for the car crash that could 
result). Many commentators, we noted, prefer fines because they allow for 
government to gather more information before acting.257  
By our logic here, ex ante taxes start to look like the best policy option when 
potential defendants are judgment proof. Defendants are judgment proof when they 
can’t borrow or insure themselves enough to pay a meaningful fraction of the 
 
256. Another way to put this is that changes in the frequency of detection for the first-best 
instrument have smaller variance costs than changes in the frequency of its alternatives. When we 
compare the policy of increasing the probability of conviction, versus increasing imprisonment, the 
former has the effect of not introducing additional variance. Consider, for example, the situation where 
no imprisonment is used, the cost is P (probability of detection) times F (the fine amount). Obviously, 
no heterogeneity is caused by higher P. But, when a regulator increases a prison sentence from 0 to S, 
the sanction becomes P(F+S), where S varies across individuals. Thus, on the margin, we should use 
more P than S. This means that we impose fines more frequently, but we still use exhaustive fines. 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 59–73. 
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optimal fine. Polinsky and Shavell consider whether government should then turn 
to incarceration (or other nondollar options, presumably, in pure regulatory cases 
where jail is not an available incentive).258 Once more, this position is a  
trade-off: what government gains in information by waiting, it loses in switching 
from a “transfer” instrument (taxes, which can be used to pay for useful things) to 
a transferless instrument (prison, which mostly causes deadweight loss).259  
What we add to this choice is that there are actually two major costs to  
prison: besides being nontransferable, its variance is also much greater. Prison and 
other ex post alternatives to taxes create an information-information tradeoff. 
Government might learn more about the marginal social costs and benefits of the 
regulated activity, but it now knows less about how regulated actors respond to its 
chosen incentive. 
Of course, prison isn’t usually an issue for corporations, the main subject of 
this Section. The reader can think instead of dissolution, disgrace, or other nondollar 
penalties that could be imposed on a bankrupt firm.260 More commonly, our point 
will apply to individuals. We mentioned in the last section that dollar-denominated 
incentives, even though varying, could still be less variant than other alternatives. 
That’s one scenario we envision here: it may be better to switch to taxes rather than 
incarceration when taxes are a less varying instrument than jail. For individuals too 
poor to pay even the relatively lower prices that ex ante incentives would allow, 
regulators could use dollar rewards instead.261  
 A final observation we’d make about the risk-neutral case is that  
risk-neutrality can itself be influenced by the regulator. For example, individuals can 
be compelled to acquire insurance, or government can construct a regime, such as 
the social security and unemployment insurance systems, in which government 
collection of taxes and distribution of revenues serves as the economic equivalent 
of mandatory insurance.262 In the case of firms, the finance literature suggests that 
the costs of bankruptcy and other imperfections in the market for outside financing 
are (aside from managers acting in their own interests rather than the firm’s) the 
main drivers of whatever risk aversion most firms exhibit.263 Reforms to bankruptcy 
 
258. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 22, at 419. 
259. Miriam H. Baer, Pricing the Fourth Amendment, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1103, 1150–53 
(2017); Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 
864–88 (2014). 
260. Another set of alternatives would be to impose individual punishments on managers or 
investors, but these too can create their own sets of costs. See Kraakman, supra note 111, at 869–71. 
And, of course, the managers themselves can be personally shamed. Id. at 880. 
261. While there is an obvious potential moral hazard concern with rewards, we think this 
concern is often overstated, an argument we defer for further exposition elsewhere. 
262. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 223, at 238–47; Levitt, supra note 132, at 181–82; Viscusi, 
supra note 11, at 608 (noting that mandatory insurance can be a solution to judgment-proof defendants). 
263. Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Risk Management: Coordinating 
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, 48 J. FIN. 1629, 1632–33 (1993). Empirical evidence does 
suggest that managerial risk preferences are quite important, though. Gordon M. Bodnar, Erasmo 
Giambona, John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, A View Inside Corporate Risk Management (Duke 
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(for example, to reduce existing investors’ risk of losing control of the firm) thus 
might have some influence over firm perception of risk. 
These maneuvers are obviously not always free or even easy but might be 
worthwhile to the extent that the risk-neutral case offers a more appealing set of 
regulatory choices. With risk-averse parties, the regulator often must choose among 
a set of highly variant instruments so that her task is to pick the least bad. When 
parties are risk neutral, though, fines and similar instruments—including Pigouvian 
taxes, fees, and the like—are much more predictable. In other words, switching to 
a risk-neutral regime may greatly improve the efficiency of the regulator’s first-best 
instrument.264 These gains could well justify the costs of making parties  
indifferent to risk. 
As an example, consider the possible regulation of risky firearms. The United 
States currently does little to encourage firearm owners to internalize the social cost 
of widespread firearm ownership.265 While there may also be positive externalities 
from gun owning, such as deterring crime or tyranny, these benefits are probably 
just as available in a world where firearms create far fewer risks. Incentives for safe 
gun storage, use, and transfer are likely compatible with whatever benefits  
firearms offer.266  
As other commentators recognize, the difficulty is that civil liability would 
have a highly disparate impact on lower-income households and would usually 
exceed any gun owner’s available wealth.267 Few owners would have incentives to 
buy insurance on their own. Compulsory insurance—or, equivalently, a  
risk-adjusted ex ante Pigouvian regime in which registration fees for riskier weapons 
are higher—would not only make price-based regulation of guns feasible, it would 
also make it considerably more efficient by reducing its variance.268  
 
Innovation & Entrepreneurship, Working Paper No. 16-6, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2438884 [https://perma.cc/TJ9U-ZHC6]. 
264. Cf. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the 
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 732 
(2001) (noting that insurance makes fines more effective because fewer firms are judgment-proof). 
265. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE 
THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 2 (Alan I. Leshner, Bruce M. Altevogt, Arlene F. Lee, 
Margaret A. McCoy & Patrick W. Kelley eds., 2013), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18319/priorities-
for-research-to-reduce-the-threat-of-firearm-related-violence [https://perma.cc/XQE5-HQSQ]. 
266. For discussion of how liability might affect the marginal incentives of gun owners to reduce 
risk, see George A. Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1231–41 (2014). Even 
Second Amendment advocates concede that regulation of risky gun ownership is likely constitutional. 
E.g., Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design 
Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y’S PRAC. GRPS. 18,  
19–20 (2013). 
267. Mocsary, supra note 266, at 1228. 
268. As the example suggests, compulsory insurance does not eliminate risk aversion. Insurance 
premia or risk-adjusted fees might still impose a heavy burden on some households. But this burden is 
much smaller than a tort award.  
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CONCLUSION 
Humans, we’ve argued, are not vending machines. Regulators can’t drop an 
incentive into a slot and expect the same output every time. Although other 
commentators have shared our view about the subjectivity of human experience, 
they’ve drawn very different lessons from it. Some have said that regulators can 
detect and correct for varying responses. Others have said detection is hopeless and 
that regulators should abandon the project of regulation.  
While we doubt that regulators can ever really identify and correct for 
subjectivity, we nonetheless largely defend the regulatory state, including the 
criminal law and economic analysis of it. Uncertainty about how the subjects of 
regulation will respond to incentives is indeed a problem for rigorous analysis of 
how to regulate. But it is not a hopeless task. Instead, we’ve shown ways in which 
regulation can adapt to the challenge of uncertainty. For example, our framework 
shows a regulator how to choose between similar instruments, such as fines and 
suspensions, that prior work did not clearly distinguish.  
Along the way, we’ve shown that subjective responses to incentives unsettle 
some well-established verities of economic theory. Fines are not always the best way 
to regulate humans. Sealed records and confidential settlements can be more 
efficient than shaming and bad reputation. And for firms, small fees or Pigouvian 
taxes on risks may be superior to large fines on bad outcomes.  
We’ve also added to what we think is already a strong case for fundamentally 
reforming the U.S. criminal justice system. Prison, to the extent we must resort to 
it, could well be more efficient if it were less cruel and alienating. It may even be 
preferable to use rewards, such as targeted education, cash, or criminal-diversion 
programs, to keep people out of the criminal justice system altogether.269  
Of course, there is always more ground to cover. One potential extension we 
want to highlight is the application of our theory to the use of shaming or social 
norms to control behavior. As others recognize, public opinion and self-image can 
be powerful tools in shaping human behavior.270 But available evidence suggests 
that different individuals respond quite differently to these kinds of incentives,271 
suggesting that norms often won’t be the tool regulators should turn to first. At the 
same time, though, it may be that every formal incentive offered or imposed by 
government also carries with it a message about social norms.272 For instance, very 
small taxes on plastic bags seem to have quickly flipped public perception of 
whether plastic bags are acceptable.273 If that is true, then even the most seemingly 
 
269. For a review of the relative desirability of rewards and punishments, see Ehrlich, supra  
note 6. 
270. An essential overview is Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Law and Norms (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17579, 2011). 
271. Id. at 12–13. 
272. Cf. Kahan & Posner, supra note 84, at 374 (pointing out that imprisonment causes shame).  
273. Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects?: The Impact of Taxes 
Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 177, 177–79 (2018). 
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predictable of instruments, such as small ex ante taxes, in fact carry a potentially 
large and unpredictable component.274 Our account here suggests that managing 
these side effects may be critically important for regulators.  
For the meanwhile, we offer what we think is an important first step in a new 
direction in regulatory design. 
 
274. Much depends on exactly the nature of the information that is conveyed by the formal 
incentive. For more discussion, see Murat C. Mungan, A Generalized Model for Reputational Sanctions and 
the (Ir)relevance of Interactions Between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 46 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 86 (2016). 
